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1 GENERAL ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT
The rate of change in the stock of real fixed capital is one of the less satis-
factorily processes in present economic thinking. Investment
shows extreme fluctuations over time and, to a great extent, fluctuations
that do not fit into a simple theoretical framework. In addition there are
difficulties in concept and measurement. One of the prime tasks ahead,
however, seems to be to pry into the actual investment process from a
largely empirical point of view. We must learn more facts about investment
and try to use them to establish a sound theory of investment among the
embarrassing number of candidates.
As a practical 'matter in business cycle control, it has often more
satisfactory for the state to adopt counter-cyclical measures to maintain
an even flow of investment rather than an even flow of consumption,
speaking roughly of the two as exhausting national production. In many
cases it is not politically feasible or desirable to try to influence personal,
household expenditures in a predetermined fashion, but direct state invest-
ment or state support of private investment is a workable alternative only
if public authorities know such things as the correct timing of their action,
the correct magnitudes involved, and the underlying factors that determine
investment decisions. Those among us who would attempt to minimize the
amount of direct state influence in economic activities must concentrate
on the last mentioned item, the underlying factors, in order that they can
recommend the appropriate indirect state action to influence investment.
A popular modern view of economic life holds that patterns of invest-
ment behavior are volatile as compared with other types of economi.c
behavior, especially household consumption and savings. The factual evi-
dence of the interwar period gives strong support to this hypothesis, but
some would interpret the postwar patterns of consumer spending and sav-
ing as evidence that contradicts the assumption of relative stability in the
household sector of the economy. While we must recognize the postwar
spending spree as evidence, we may very well reserve judgment on the
*Theauthor is indebted to Arlene Shapiro for research assistance and computa-
tional work on this study and to H. Irving Forman for the preparation of the charts.
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basis that we have observed a very temporary and special event that can
be explained in terms of war abstinence, war finance, demobilization, and
other factors that tend to disappear as normalcy is approached. On the
other hand, normalcy may have little effect on the volatility of investment
behavior because of the nature of the decision-making process.
The carrying out of an investment act takes time, in many cases several
months or even years, and contracts or other types of commitment are
often involved. For these reasons, and others, it has become popular for
the government and some private agencies to conduct investment surveys,
asking entrepreneurs, in advance, the volume of their intended investment
expenditures during a specific period. Potentially, these surveys could be
scientifically organized so as to throw some light on the reasohs for invest-
ment decisions and thus enable the government to forecast the effect of
some of its manifold economic policies upon investment. Unfortunately,
this type of material is not yet available on a satisfactory basis. But the
state surveys of investment intentions are so organized as to throw some
light on the timing and magnitude of forthcoming investment.
The surveys in this country, carried out by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Department of Commerce, ask a sample of business
firms how much they intend to spend (gross) on capital goods one quarter
in advance and two quarters in advance. It is evident that there are two
forecasts of each quarter, 3 months in advance and 6 months in advance.
From the fourth quarter of 1945 through the first quarter of 1949, the
average absolute value of the percentage error between forecast and obser-
vation was 9.3 per cent for the first estimate (two quarters ahead) of
total investment, and from the third quarter of 1945 through the first
quarter of 1949, it was 5.5 per cent for the second estimate (one quarter
ahead). If total investment is split into categories (manufacturing and
mining, railroads, electric and gas utilities, other transportation, commer-
cial, and miscellaneous) the errors become much larger and maintain the




Manufacturing and mining 10.8% 7.1%
Railroads 26.7 19.5
Electric and gas utilities 7.9 7.0
Other transportation, commercial and miscellaneous 15.7 12.4
Total 9.3 5.5
Source: Press releases of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The surveys have yet to weather a major cyclical turn.' Add to this their
'The mild downturn in investment from the fourth quarter of 1948 to the first quar-.
ter of 1949 was, however, reflected in both the first and second forecasts. See the
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recorded performance in the contagious postwar boom and it does not
become certain that they will serve as a solution, in their present form, to
the forecasting problem. The above figures do show something also about
the extreme volatility of investment.
The size of the error is substantial. The error may be a random variable
that is part of the structure of the economic system; then we can do little
more than recognize it in forecasting and try to measure its probable varia-
bility. This view fits in with much of modern business cycle theory. On the
other hand, the error may have some nonrandom, systematic components
which, if discovered, would enable forecasters to reduce its size. An analy-
sis of the time series of the quarterly errors since 1945 does reveal some
nonrandom behavior. The great preponderance of ratios of estimates to
observation are less than unity. There also appear to be some systematic
differences among the errors for the several industrial sectors.
INVESTMENT IN PLANT AND EQUIPMENT, SURVEYS OF THE SEC AND
USDC (millions of current dollars)
Year First Second
and Estimate Estimate Observation
Quarter Z2 Z3
1945
III 1,640 1,650 0.99
IV 1,780 1,870 2,300 0.77 0.81
1946
I 2,090 2,120 2,200 0.95 0.96
II 2,390 2,890 2,790 0.86 1.04
III 3,200 3,300 3,310 0.97 L00
IV 3,400 3,650 3,730 0.91 0.98
1947
I 3,640 3,440 3,160 1.15 1.09
II 3,560 3,670 3,940 0.90 0.93
.111 3,770 4,070 4,140 0.91 0.98
IV 4,020 4,440 4,940 0.81 0.90
1948
I 4,100 4,480 4,170 0.98 1.07
II 4,780 4,690 4,820 0.99 0.97
III 4,570 4,950 4,830 0.95 1.02
IV 4,690 5,010 5,410 0.87 0.93
1949
I 4,390 4,680 4,460 0.98 1.05
It may be that a single quarter is too short a period in which to forecast
anything as lumpy and discontinuous as the average investment outlay.
The surveys are conducted also on an annual basis, asking business firms
about their prospective capital expenditures during a future calendar year.
This procedure has the advantage, in terms of accuracy of realization, of
evening out expenditures over a longer time span and the disadvantage of
taking a look further into the future. The 1947 annual forecast for all
sectors covered was $14 billion; the 1948 annual forecast, $18.7 billion.236 PART TWO
These are to be compared with realized expenditures of $16.2 billion in
1947 and $19.2 billion in 1948; thus the errors were of the order of 14
and 3 per cent respectively.2
The Canadian government conducts an annual investment survey. In
the closing months of a year it asks business firms to state their intended
outlays for plant and equipment during the following twelve months.
Canadian survey estimates of capital expenditures for manufacturing, pri-
mary industry, and utilities were 75.1 per cent of realized expenditures in
1946; survey estimates for the same industries, plus construction, com-
mercial, merchandising, and service industries were 99.4 per cent of
realized expenditures in 1947; and survey estimates for the same industries
as in 1947 were 94.9 per cent of realized expenditures in 1948. The Cana-
dian surveys are not small samples, but cover firms spending more than
60 per cent of the outlays for private capital formation.3 In the conditions
of the postwar boom, the Canadian government wisely carried out another
survey on the production of basic and building materials as a check upon
the supply side of the investment market. A combination of the two surveys
was much more helpful than a survey of investment intentions alone in
formulating government policy.
The two latest Canadian surveys, in contrast to the first, show some
promise for forecasting investment, but they have not yet had the experi-
ence of a sizable turning point in economic activity and show wider errors
in industry components than in national totals. Like the United States sur-
veys, they do not answer the 'whys?' associated with investment decisions.
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to go more deeply into the
nature of investment decisions and to describe the results of empirical
investigations the author has recently carried out. In the remainder of this
section we shall dwell on the general theory of investment and some of the
empirical studies already published.
In terms of the accounting records of business firms, we must first dis-
tinguish between those expenditures on real property that are wholly
charged to current operating expenses appearing on the profit and loss or
income statement, and those expenditures on real property that are only
partly charged to current operating expenses. The first category is usually
recorded as maintenance and repair expenditures, the second as capital
expenditures. The portion of capital expenditures that is written off against
2SeeMelville J. Ulmer, Plant and Equipment Programs and Sales Expectatons in
1949, Survey of Current Business, April 1949, pp. 9-13.
3For documentation see Department of Reconstruction and Supply: Forecast of
1947 Investment by Canadian Business and Private and Public Investment in
Canada; Department of Trade and Commerce: Private andPublicInvestment in
Canada (Ottawa, 1947, 1948, and 1949 respectively).INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 237
the revenues of a single accounting period is usually called depreciation
expense. Our task is to provide an explanation of capital expenditures in
terms of underlying motivational factors.
The most sophisticated and general view of economic activity presents
a single, multivariate process that accounts simultaneously for such diverse
things as capital expenditures, maintenance expenses, wage payments, raw
material expenditures, and even household expenditures. At an early stage
of scientific work, however, there are certain advantages in introducing
a dichotomy between short-run and long-run decisions. In following this
approach, we shall assume that entrepreneurs make two types of decisions,
one type involving short-run, day to day fluctuations in variables associated
with current expense (maintenance, manpower, raw materials, etc.); and
another type involving longer-run fluctuations in variables associated with
capital expenditures (durable equipment and plant). The short-run prob-
lem for the business firm may be viewed as the organization of the currently
variable factors of production in the most profitable combination for the
existing capital structure. The longer-run problem may be viewed as the
choice of the most profitable capital structure. The entrepreneur, contem-
plating a capital expenditure, will in principle forecast future expenses
arising from an economical combination of short-run factors of production
applied to the new capital goods over the expected lifetime of the latter.
Expected future receipts minus expected future expenses, properly dis-
cou.nted to the present, will show the expected future gain to be realized
on the contemplated capital expenditure. The decision to make the capital
outlay or not will hinge upon a comparison between the size of the outlay
and the expected gain. This very general approach can be empirically de-
scribed by a variety of mathematical expressions. Moreover, several refine-
ments and elaborations can be introduced; some variables are involved
that are not available in the factual records; and there are many 'irrational'
types of investment decisions. In case the discounting factor for the
expected future gain includes a pure interest rate as well as compensation
for risk, interest charges should not enter as a cost item subtracted from
anticipated receipts. In terms of accounting conventions, the expected
future gain is identified with expected future 'operating profits'. If the
discount factor is composed solely of subjective risk and interest charges
are not subtracted from anticipated receipts, we may compare the ratio
between expected incremental operating profits and the outlay with the
interest rate for new capital. When the discounted future rate of return
exceeds the interest rate, the entrepreneur should invest. The same phe-
nomena can be expressed in other forms.
A simple profit calculus may be quite inadequate to express an entre-
preneur's investment decision. He may be interested in other things besides238 PART TWO
profit; e.g., the size of his firm, its leadership position in the industry or
wider circles, or its modern character. Thus the size, age, and composition
of the present capital structure may also be important variables in invest-
ment planning. The size of the present capital stock may also enter in
another way. The rate of return on old (existing) capital as well as that on
new capital should be compared with the interest rate. In many cases it
may seem unnecessary to embark upon new capital creating ventures
because the same rate of return can be obtained from the existing capital
stock. The rate of return on existing capital may enter in yet another way
as one of the least unreliable indicators of the expected gain on new capital.
Often an investor knows little about the real performance of new capital,
and the expected profit calculus is subject to an extremely large error,
rendering this calculus inadequate for explaining motivations in situa-
tions of uncertainty.
The purely rational profit calculus deals with marginal expected profits,
marginal with respect to the variation of the capital stock. Marginal profit
is not easily estimated, except for some individual investment decisions,
and objective calculations of this variable are available, if at all, only in
the internal records of business firms. Our best substitute for marginal
profit is current profit on existing capital. The time-rate-of-change and
acceleration of realized profits also may be important in judging the future
course of profits. In addition to operating profit and its past history, such
variables as interest rates, the stock of capital, and the age of capital may
determine investment according to the above considerations.
The 'perfectly rationaP business man operating in a smoothly function-
ing capital market should, in principle, have no preference for using his
own rather than borrowed capital funds, but in actual experience probably
will; thus we frequently encounter the view today that entrepreneurs prefer
to use internal funds for investment. This is undoubtedly conditioned to a
large extent by the institutional environment. To the extent that a prefer-
ence for internal financing of investment exists, it should strengthen the
role of currently realized profits in determining investment decisions. Other
funds such as past accumulations of working capital, current nonoperat-
ing profits, and the deferment of current dividends also may have some
importance. Accordingly, the influence of interest rates may be lessened.
Many cost items —wages,raw materials, maintenance (nonwage), etc.
—affectoperating profits. When the unit costs of noncapital items (labor
and raw materials) become large relative to the unit costs of capital items
(maintaining plant and equipment), it pays the entrepreneur to consider
investment in capital instruments. The expected marginal profit calculus
should, of course, bring out all such cost-saving potentialities, but the
empirical investigator, working with realized profits, may find it useful to
consider relative unit costs as a further important variable showing theINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 239
desirability of substituting capital for other factors of production. This
and other reasons may cause investment to depend on technological
change.
Among past empirical studies of investment behavior, three are chosen
for comment in order to give some indication of the existing state of
knowledge on the subject. The pioneering econometric study of Tinbergen4
is one of the most comprehensive and, in many respects, has stood the test
of time. It covers the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, the
United States; pre- and post-World War I data; and such diverse magni-
tudes as aggregate investment, housing, and railroad investment. In a
broad sense more recent econometric studies are merely refinements as to
methods of statistical inference, form of the mathematicaj relationships,
and estimation of the basic series. Tinbergen's study is based entirely upon
classical multiple correlation techniques whereby each relationship of an
equation system is considered from a statistical point of view in isolation.
Since there are definite lags between his explanatory variables and invest-
ment expenditures, his statistical techniques may not be as unsuitable for
the study of investment as for other types of economic behavior. However,
for aggregate investment, the lags may not be longer than the accounting
period of observation of the variables in the analysis; therefore some simul-
taneous interaction probably exists among the several variables in Tin-
bergen's investment equations. To be very specific, Tinbergen believes
that the lag between 12-month investment outlays and 12-month profits
is a fraction of one year; hence a portion of his 'explanatory' profit variable
coincides in time with his (annual) investment variable. In his study of
investment in railway rolling stock, he is able to make direct observations
on the lag between orders and deliveries and finds that the basic lag
between profit and investment shoul.d be at least one year, in the pre-
World War I period. For aggregate investment no material is available
from which to estimate the lag independently, and it is highly probable
that there is a bias in his estimate of the lag by multiple correlation tech-
niques. I have found that the average lag between net investment and non-
wage income changes if one uses an 'equation system' method instead of
the 'single equation least-square' approach. The former method takes
account of the simultaneous interaction between profits and investment,
but the latter wrongly assumes that profits influence investment without
being influenced by investment. However, the estimate of the sum of the
coefficients of lagged and current nonwage income terms remains about
the same for various methods of estimation.5
'Jan Tinbergen, Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, I, A Method and
Its Application to Investment Activity (League of Nations, Geneva, 1939).
5See L. R. Klein, Economic Fluctuations in the United States, 1921-1941 (Wiley,
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Tinbergen correlates United States investment with several variables —
corporateprofits, share yields, unit profit margins, short-term interest
rates, pig iron prices, first differences in the cost of living index, first differ-
ences in consumer goods production. Some different variables appear in
the analyses of the other countries. One criticism of his method is that it is
an inefficient use of information within the framework of multiple corre-
lation analysis. Corporate profits, share yields, and unit profit margins
reflect the same phenomena and thus play overlapping roles in determining
investment activity. Profits are presumably taken after interest charges,
then interest is introduced as a separate variable. This point has been
explicitly criticized by T. Haavelmo.° The reader should not get the impres-
sion, though, that Tinbergen was, at any time, unaware of these difficulties,
for they are specifically mentioned in his volume.
It would be wrong to criticize Tinbergen for using data that do not
follow, precisely, the concepts he uses. Iron and steel consumption was
undoubtedly one of the best indicators he could obtain for English and
German investment before World War I. Similarly, the price of pig iron
may have been the best available index of capital goods prices. The original
empirical work of this paper is limited to periods for which direct esti-
mates of the relevant variables are available. A remarkable feature of its
findings and of other studies based on superior, recent data is the extent to
which many of Tinbergen's results are confirmed.
The principal finding of Tinbergen's investigation is that profit is the
main determinant of investment activity. This result is not surprising, but
it is valuable, particularly because the magnitudes are estimated. The other
variables studied such as pig iron prices and interest rates show results
that are not always statistically significant or that contradict a priori ideas
on the direction of influence. There is no uniformity among countries for
these other variables. The United States data, 1919-33, show a strong
influence of share yields as well as profits. I suspect the general validity of
this result because Tinbergen's observations covered a period is
unlike its successor in the importance given to the share market in eco-
nomic life. In separate studies of housing and railroad equipment, Tin-
bergen finds that variables peculiar to these special markets play a strong
role in investment activity: rent, construction costs, interest rates, stock
of houses, and nonwage income or corporate profits are used in the hous-
ing study; railroad profits, traffic and its rate of change, iron prices, and
interest rates, in the railroad study. As would be expected, interest rates
play a stronger role in these two special areas of investment, where capital
goods have high durability. More detailed comments •on the relation
The Effect of the Rate of Interest on Investment: A Note, Review of Economic
Statistics, February 1941, pp. 49-52.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 241
between Tinbergen's results for railway rolling stock and our own results
from more recent data, covering both road and equipment, will be pre-
sented in the following section. The housing equations of Tinbergen are
not seriously contradicted by my own studies except for the relative orders
of importance of some variables and the explicit treatment of family for-
mation, an important demographic variable not satisfactorily dealt with
in Tinbergen's volume.
In previous studies I have attempted to estimate the parameters of
investment equations formulated on the basis of a rather general theory
of the firm.7 This approach leads to an equation that relates net investment
(constant prices) to current and lagged nonwage income (constant prices)
arid the existing stock of real capital. The parameters are jointly estimated
along with those in other equations of a system taken to represent the
United States in the interwar period. In another model the demand for
new producers' plant and equipment is treated as a function of the stock
of real producers' plant and equipment, and current and lagged real pro-
duction multiplied by the ratio of the output price to the capital goods
price. Housing as a function of rents, construction costs, family formation,
income, and bond yields is treated in separate equations within the model.
Inventories are similarly split off from the rest of investment. There are
differences of detail between this work and Tinbergen's, but the general
approaches are more alike than different. The statistical estimation meth-
ods are different; share yields are important in Tinbergen's 1919-33 analy-
sis; the stock of real capital is not used in Tinbergen's aggregate investment
function; family formation is not a variable in Tinbergen's housing equa-
tion; etc. However, it is not the function of this paper to go into all these
details.
A third study of investment, prepared for the TNEC,8 is worthy of men-
tion here, not because of its concrete contributions to the problems con-
fronting us, but because of one aspect of its technique. In two industries,
oil and steel, the intercompany variations between investment and profits
are analyzed. The cross-section samples give new information about invest-
ment behavior that is not contained in the time series of industry or
national aggregates.
The percentage change in property accounts for individual companies
is correlated with the rate of return on invested capital. The validity of the
book value data used is subject to question, but certain plausible findings
stand out. The statistical significance of the relations in many of the mdi-
L. R. Klein, op. cit.,Ch.II; and Notes on the Theory of Investment, Kykios,
II, 1948, 21.
TNEC Monograph 12,Profits,Productive Activities and New Investment, by Mar-
tin Taitel (Washington, 1941).242 PART TWO
vidual years studied is, indeed, weak, but there is definitely a stronger
relation when the investment and profits for individual companies are
computed for two to five years rather than for a single year. It is entirely
possible that the anatomy of investment decisions will become clear only
from data taken from periods longer than one year. Two variables, in addi-
tion to profits are cited in this study as being determinants of investment,
the rate of capacity utilization and technology. The rate of capacity utiliza-
tion is related to the stock of real capital which has proved to be of some
statistical importance in time series studies. The TNEC study does not
give a rigorous statistical justification for singling out capacity and tech-
nology as investment-determining variables; they are cited on the basis of
a rough inspection of the investment-profits scatter diagrams.
2 RAILROAD INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
There are severe limits to the amount of information contained in annual
time series of total United States investment for time spans of 20-30 years
or even longer. This type of material has been examined many times over,
and decreasing returns will accrue to research workers who do not adopt
some new lines of approach. Tremendous advantages are to be gained by
studying refined industrial sectors, for then a whole corpus of institutional
knowledge will be available for getting a better picture of the investment
process in the real world.
Within selected industries there is a great deal of homogeneity among
the several firms because all are producing the same goods or services and
often use similar production techniques. The homogeneity makes it pos-
sible to study cross-section data as well as time series on investment. Iden-
tical variables are likely to have widely differing quantitative influences on
investment in different industries. Some variables need not be taken into
account in some industries and are important in others. There may even
be industrial differences in the direction of influence of some variables.
All these should be sufficient reasons for the study of investment in sepa-
rate industries. Here we are concerned solely with United States railroad
investment. It may be looked upon as a pilot study that could be extended
to other sectors of the economy in order to put investment behavior on an
established empirical basis. The railroad industry is selected as a starting
point because it is a major component of aggregate investment; it has a
great wealth of statistical data, especially cross-section material; its regu-
lation aspects simplify some matters; and it may shed light on the signifi-
cance of the interest rate in investment decisions.
The profits derived from railroad operations accrue to privately owned
corporations that make the investment decisions. Investment, like other
variables in the industry, is regulated in many ways, however, by theINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 243
Interstate Commerce Commission. The construction of new lines cannot
be undertaken unless authorized by the ICC and likewise for the abandon-
ment of old lines (disinvestment). Many safety devices, calling for sub-
stantial investment outlays, are required by the ICC. The railroads, being
classified as a public service industry, are required to accept traffic as
offered by shippers. In the short run, individual roads can do little to influ-
ence their output and must maintain their capital goods so as to meet the
forthcoming volume of traffic. This has led some authors to invoke the
'acceleration principle' in explaining railroad investment. We shall con-
sider this point below. ICC regulation extends also to such matters as the
corporate structure of the industry, the determination of transportation
rates (perhaps, the most widely discussed), and accounting procedures.
We must always try to keep the institutional knowledge of the regulatory
aspects of the industry in the back of our minds as we study the facts con-
cerning the private investment decisions.
Another important fact concerning this country's railroads is that they
comprise a relatively mature sector of the economy. The era of youthful
expansion of railroads occurred in the previous century. For the past two
or three decades or even longer there has been a declining amount of invest-
ment in new lines. Although investment in roadway and structures was
as large as investment in equipment until the middle 1930's, the capital
expenditures for such things as track have been to a large extent for an
improved type of track, or extra track, rather than for track to serve new
areas. One of the main reasons why we may now look upon railroading
as mature is that newer forms of transportation are growing up and dis-
placing rail service. From November 1920 to December 31, 1943, the ICC
authorized the abandonment of 29,012 miles of railroad line in 1,971 pro-
ceedings.° Highway (truck and automobile) competition was cited as the
principal factor responsible for the abandonment of 58percent of the
total abandoned mileage. Other leading causes were exhaustion of natural
resources, 19 per cent, and rationalization (elimination of duplicate rail-
road service, etc.), 10 per cent. Abandonments are also more frequent in
areas of relative population decline.
A completely mature, stationary industry can supply the prevailing
volume of output with the existing stock of capital. In this steady-state
situation gross investment just equals depreciation expenses. In a rela-
tively mature industry such as United States railroads, a changing volume
of traffic, substitution of capital for labor under economic pressure, tech-
nological change, intercompany competition, and other factors tmajntajn
a level of net investment that is positive except in extremely depressed
°RailroadAbandonments, 1920-1943, ICC, Bureau of Transport Economics and
Statistics (Washington, D. C., January 1945).244 PART TWO
periods.'0 The change from a roadway of light rails and ties and no ballast
in the last century to the modern heavy railed, ballasted road which accom-
modates high speed trains is a technological change that involved much
investment. Rails have been improved progressively, and ties are now
treated so that their life is effectively doubled as compared with nontreated
ties still in existence. Diesel engines were introduced in switching service
in the '20's and Diesel electric locomotives have been the object of large
scale investment since 1934. The steam locomotive is also being improved
to save fuel, increase speeds, and increase tractive power. Technological
change in locomotives necessitated changes in tracks and roadbed, which
are now real limiting factors. Until the latter part of the 19th century the
average capacity of freight cars was 10 tons;" modern cars have a capacity
of more than 50 tons. Readers are only too well aware of the changes in
passenger equipment during the past two decades. Other less obvious tech-
nological improvements include automatic signal systems, automatic train
control devices, automatic couplers, shock absorption devices, braking
devices, car retarders, and numerous other devices. Some of these improve-
ments are interrelated, one requiring the other. We can only expect that
these changes will continue into the future, possibly even at an intensified
pace; therefore the maturity status of the industry does not rule out large
scale investment. Caution should be taken, however, against romanticizing
the investment process in this or other industries as some economists are
prone to do. Entrepreneurs are not always frantically searching for an
innovation in which to invest or copying another's recent innovation. A
great proportion of investment decisions are routine, and much of the
investment in new types of capital goods represents replacement of worn
out capital with the latest, improved variety. In the latter case, technologi-
cal change is not responsible for the investment, but it would be pointless
for an entrepreneur not to replace his facilities with the best available. It is
difficult to estimate the net effect of technological change on investment
because the changes have been occurring simultaneously with so many
other things such as the need for replacement and profitability, but we
may get some indication from a questionnaire survey of Class I roads con-
ducted by the ICC. The roads were asked, "How much should be expended
annually during the 3 years, 1939-194 1 for additions, betterments, and
extensions over and above the total shown for deferred maintenance
10Appendix Table 1, columns 1, 3, 4, presents annual gross investment, recorded and
unrecorded depreciation. Without making the refinement of revaluing depreciation
charges to replacement costs, we find that net investment was positive in 1921-41,
except in 193 1-36 and 1938-39.
11This figure is taken from P. Harvey Middleton, Railways and the Equipment and
Supply industry (Railway Business Association, 1941). The earliest ICC figure is
for fiscal 1903, showing an average capacity of 29.4 tons.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 245
toenable respondent to handle more cheaply or expeditiously a volume
of traffic equal to that actually handled in 1937?"12 The replies totaled
$495,757,106 for three years' capital outlays designed to handle a given
traffic volume more cheaply or expeditiously. A large part of this outlay
may perhaps be regarded as going into technological improvements. Gross
capital expenditures for 1937 alone were estimated by the ICC to be $541
million and were at an average annual level of $521 million during the
entire interwar period. This is by no means a perfect experimental situa-
tion, but it does give some indication of the magnitudes involved.
The effective life of railroad rolling stock varies from 20 to 40 years
depending upon the nature of the equipment. Major items of road and
structures depreciate at even slower rates. Treated ties now last about 25
years and new rail about 19 years. Some equipment for maintenance and
other purposes lasts a much shorter period, say less than 10 years. But, for
the most part, railroads 'must try to look ahead 20 years or more for large
scale investment projects, and they are not allowed to write off assets in a
shorter period than their known service lives. For investments of this type
we can expect that interest calculations would be much more decisive than
in manufacturing industries where equipment is required to pay for ifself
in less than five years.'3
After World War I, and particularly in the great depression, railroads
found access to the capital market difficult. It was not easy for them to sell
stocks or ordinary long term bonds at favorable prices.'4 Equipment trust
certificates were the one type of security that remained open to them at low
interest rates. Equipment trusts are peculiar to this industry and now pro-
vide funds for financing equipment investments at 2.0-2.5 per cent. The
railroads have shown an extremely good record in meeting interest pay-
ments on these securities.
It is well known that 'many railroads failed to meet their interest charges
during the 1930's and were declared bankrupt. The large bankrupt com-
panies continued operation under receivership or trusteeship, during which
time their whole asset-liability structure was overhauled through court
action. The most important reorganization decisions reduced the heavy
interest payments on borrowed capital which had grown to unwieldy pro-
portions. Reorganization plans approved by or proposed to the ICC as of
12FinaflcialRequirements of Railways (Summary of returns on statistical series cir-
cular No. 26), ICC, Bureau of Statistics (March 1939).
See George Terborgh, Dynamic Equipment Policy (McGraw-Hill, 1949), Ch. XII.
14SeeIrwin Friend, Business Financing in the Postwar Period, Survey of Current
Business, March 1948, pp. 10-6, for statistics on new stock and bond issues for rail-
roads, 1919-47. After 1930 there have been no new stock issues except for a small
amount in 1945.246 PART TWO
October 31, 194115 showed the accompanying alterations. For some
Debt before reorganization $3,993,901,463
Debt after reorganization 1,729,134,094
Annual fixed charges before reorganization 142,191,942
Annual fixed charges after reorganization 41,043,119
roads,16 the approved plans showed a much greater percentage reduction
in annual fixed charges to figures less than 25percent of the original. Such
large reductions of interest charges could be expected to figure importantly
in investment behavior. During reorganization proceedings a road can
argue that it needs a greater reduction in fixed charges to enable it to
modernize and thus provide transportation on a profitable basis in the
future. As will be seen below, this institutional phenomenon had profound
effect on investment in the years after the depression trough of 1932. Dur-
ing the recent war many roads earned sufficient profits to pay off outstand-
ing debts and emerge from receivership; therefore investment in the near
future may be less influenced by reorganization.
Before we examine the investment records it may be useful to consider
briefly an expository cost calculation by the Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany concerning an expenditure for machinery to be used for laying rail.'7
The cost of one outfit was put at $34,273. The costs of laying one unit of
rail by machinery and by hand are compared in the accompanying table.
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY
Daily Costs of Laying 300 39 ft. Rails per Day
(1.1 miles of track and 228 tons of rail)
By Machine By Hand
Labor cost $875.81 $1189.05
Interest 38.94
Depreciation 48.70 39.91
Annual overhaul 44.41 29.32
Running repairs 36.82 15.94
Supplies 165.67 230.74
Total 1,210.35 1,547.08
In a working period of eight months —160days —thePennsylvania Rail-
road Company would save $53,876.80 as a result of introducing machin-
ery to lay rail, more than the cost of one outfit. The actual calculations have
Changes in Capitalization under Plans of Reorganization Approved by the Com-
mission or Proposed by Examiners for Railroads in Reorganization Proceedings
before the Commission, ICC, Bureau of Finance (October 31, 1941).
16Chicagoand Northwestern Railway Co.; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
Co.; St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.; Western Pacific R.R. Co.
17Takenfrom Exhibit Filed on Behalf of the Carriers before the Railroad Carrier
industry Committee (Committee No. 9) under Provisions of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938 (Washington, D. C., February 1940).INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 247
been summarized and aggregated here. Different types of labor earning
different wage rates, the costs of work trains, the costs of camp trains, and
other elements of cost were all considered in minute detail before arriving
at the final figures.'8 On the Pennsylvania Railroad, workers were receiving
an average basic rate of about 48 cents per hour at the time of the calcula-
tion. Other roads with lower wage rates would enjoy a smaller reduction in
costs. At 40 cents per hour, it would be approximately $47,407 per year;
at 35centsper hour, $41,912 per year; and at 30 cents per hour, $36,416
per year. Under all circumstances, cost considerations show that the pro-
posed investment is profitable. The interesting thing about this calculation
is not the particular set of figures presented but the rationality of the
approach. In my opinion, the typical theoretical scheme for investment
found in economic literature is not essentially different.
Many more examples are provided in the same exhibit of calculations
based on other types of mechanization such as weed burner, scarifier and
ballast leveler, rail power drill, portable track flutter, and burro crane. But
one must not get the impression that all railroad investment is based on
precise engineering reports of incremental profits. In many instances the
cost calculations depend on the expected level of traffic, which is much less
certain over the expected lifetime of capital goods. Some computations
directly involve incremental revenue as well as incremental cost; these are
subject to greater error. Personal judgment about the future, even 'irra-
tionality', or institutional practices 'may be the dominant considerations
for many investments. Some investments have been made in this industry
for the stated purpose of meeting competition. An example is the case of
one road that spent funds improving a line serving an area where it was
rumored that a competitor was considering the construction of new track.
The established road wanted to show the ICC that there was no need for
more service in the area and that construction should not be authorized for
the incoming road. This is one among many ways in which investment may
be carried out to meet competition or in which considerations other than
cost reports of engineers serve to determine capital outlays.
The first set of empirical results on railroad investment to be described
in these pages were obtained from an analysis of time series of industry
aggregates during the interwar period. Were it not for the fortuitous occur-
rence of substantial lags in the equation describing railroad investment
behavior, we would have to begin by formulating a complete model of
several equations describing many activities besides investment. Our model
would have to 'explain' both investment and profits in terms of predeter-
mined variables, but the presence of lags in our relationship enables us to
18The reasonfor larger interest charges under the hand operation is that more camp
train equipment would be needed.248 PART TWO
assume that past profits influence current investment and that current
investment does not influence past profits. This point repeats the remarks
made concerning Tinbergen's techniques for studying investment behavior.
The reader is reminded that our statistics on investment are for expendi-
tures that are generally recorded on the books of the railroads at the
time of installation.19 In a wartime memorandum of the War Production
Board,2° the average prewar lead time for procuring freight cars is 26
weeks; for passenger cars, 39 weeks; for Diesel electric locomotives, 26
weeks; for steam locomotives, 39 weeks; and for a miscellaneous category
including maintenance equipment, signals, and track parts, 8-13 weeks.
Calculations in the ifies of the National Bureau of Economic Research on
the interval between the date of order of equipment and the contemplated
date of delivery in 1937 confirm the WPB estimates. The National Bureau
estimates of the average intervals for steam locomotives, electric locomo-
tives, passenger cars and freight cars vary from 6 to 8 months for the four
types of equipment. The interval for Diesel electric locomotives is only
2.42 months in 1937. For equipment there is this technical lag which must
be put at more than a half year. Investment in road and structures will
tend to lengthen the average lag for all capital formation, and we must add
the further lag between the original formulations of the investment deci-
sion and the placing of orders for capital goods. For the sake of simplicity
in estimation we have assumed a lag of one year between annual earnings
and annual investment. In view of the information on orders and deliveries,
this does not seem unreasonable when considered as an average for the
whole industry and neglecting dispersion among the individual companies.
The earnings figure used is net railway operating income before depre-
ciation. The reasons we use operating income instead of net income are
twofold. First, we want to exclude fixed interest charges as a cost item and
introduce the average interest rate as a separate variable. It may seem
arbitrary to treat any single cost component in this way and the others as
subtractions from receipts, but we want to attempt to single out the influ-
ence of interest rates on investment. Interest rates are subject to govern-
Inthe cross-section studies the data on investment are taken directly from the
accounting reports of the individual roads to the ICC. As may be seen in the Appen-
dix, the time series for investment are taken from a special ICC study in which the
data are called "gross capital expenditures", but the distinction between out of
pocket expenditures and installations is not mentioned. In Chart 1 the time series
estimated by the ICC is compared with estimates of out of pocket expenditures pre-
pared by the Association of American Railroads. The chart shows little systematic
difference between the two series, and they exhibit essentially the same type of
movement.
Time Lag for Procurement of Selected items, WPB, Office of Operations Vice
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ment influence through the central banking system and the Treasury and
thereby play a key role in business cycle discussions. The choice between
monetary and fiscal policies to smooth out cycles depends to some extent
on the role of interest rates in investment behavior. Second, we want to
approximate, in a very rough fashion, the calculations that underlie indi-
vidual investment outlays as illustrated above in the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company example. The most recent rate of return from operations with
existing facilities is taken as an indicator of the rate of return expected on
new operations. The net income from nonrailway operations, excluding
fixed interest charges, may also influence investment, and we shall take
this possibility into account, although we begin by considering only net
railway operating income before depreciation. If all the gross investment
expenditures were for a new type of capital good based on a marginal
profitability calculation it would perhaps be more correct to regard annual





large part of gross expenditures represents routine replacement of capital
that operating profits after depreciation would understate the expenditure
potential. We have adopted the simplification of looking upon gross oper-
ating profits as a main determinant of gross investment expenditures.
In the first approximation we shall take the yield on new railroad bond
issues (the price of new capital funds) and the existing stock of fixed
capital used in operations as additional variables in the investment equa-
tion. The whole set of variables are
I =grossexpenditures on road and equipment in 19 10-14 prices
=netrailway operating income before depreciation deflated by a rail-
road construction cost index, 1910-14:1.00
K =endof year stock of fixed capital in road and equipment in 1910-14
prices
I =averageyield on new railroad bonds
The statistics cover Class I railroads during The actual
observations and sources are listed in the Appendix. I,andK are in
millions of dollars; I is in percentages. The least-squares estimates of the
parameters are
(1)1=1596 + 51i—0.14K1 + u
(0.08) (18) (0.02)
R:=0.95 S=$51 million =2.18
isthe multiple correlation coefficient andis the standard error of esti-
mate, both adjusted for degrees of freedom. The standard errors are given
in parentheses below the corresponding estimates of parameters, and the
statisticis a measure of the autocorrelation of u, the estimate of the
random perturbation. It is the ratio of the mean square successive differ-
ence to the variance of the estimates of the random error. The value of
2.18 indicates that the hypothesis of randomness in time is not rejected
by the data.
In equation (1) the average bond yield is not lagged as is the profit vari-
able. It is assumed that investment decisions are in the first instance based
on the profit outlook which carries a high degree of uncertainty, then cor-
rected for the availability of loan funds, which is indicated with much less
uncertainty by prevailing bond yields. However, calculations have been
carried out in alternative ways with the average bond yield lagged and not
lagged. The results differ little.
Profits are a dominating variable, but the yield on new bonds is also
significant. The stock of capital, K, serves as a specific trend influence. If
this variable were omitted, the coefficient of I would change sign. However,
The beginning year is selected as 1922 in order to avoid using data taken from
records during which the roads were under government operation.I N VESTMENT BEHAVIOR
Chart 2
I 1922— 1941
(1)1 = 1596 + 0.75w_1—51i — 0.14K_1+ u
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K does not differ completely from an arbitrary trend variable. It is intro-
duced for specific theoretical reasons mentioned above, but it may cover
up some other general trend influences. If a linear trend is introduced as a
fifth variable in equation (1), the coefficient of i is changed to a positive
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mature industry. My previous studies of investment behavior have used
statistics of net investment in relation to profits and the stock of capital.
The present study is noteworthy in that the investment variable is defined
as gross investment throughout, and the stock of capital plays approxi-
mately the same role as in the previous work. But on the basis of the time
series study alone, we cannot come to a definite conclusion concerning the
influence of the stock of capital because of its intercorrelation with a gen-
eral trend variable. An interesting feature of equation (1) is the quantita-
tive influence of bond yields. The interest elasticity of gross investment,
calculated at the point of means of the relevant variables, is about —0.73.
There is, of course, a sampling error associated with this figure, but it
shows, in any case, that although interest definitely influences invest-
ment, the influence is very limited. This conclusion is especially important
because we are dealing here with an industry in which the interest rate is
expected on a priori grounds to be more decisive than in other sectors of
the economy. We are also dealing with an industry that accounts for a large
but declining fraction of total interest payments. At the turn of the century,
interest payments on railroad securities were 33.5 per cent of the total and
steadily declined so that just prior to the recent war they were 17.4 per cent
of the total.22
The relation between the average bond yield and investment in equation
(1) measures the effect of interest on investment, not of investment on
interest. We make this claim because of the nature of the market we are
dealing with. Supply relationships in the capital market are very complex
and do not take the form of the demand relationship represented by (1).
The supply of funds for capital investment is not earmarked for any par-
ticular industry. The supply gets channeled into particular industries as a
result of a consideration of a whole complex of interest rates and other
variables in several industries. It is as meaningless to speak of the supply
of funds to a particular industry as to speak of the supply of unskilled labor
to a particular industry. Equation (1) has been written entirely in terms
of variables that are specific to the railroad industry and is thereby identi-
fied as distinct from the relationships describing the supply of capital funds
to several industries. Moreover, railroads seek loan funds for purposes
other than real capital formation. Since our equation deals specifically with
variables affected by the use of loan funds for real capital formation it is
even more separable from the relationship between the total supply of
funds and bond yields.
In judging the quantitative significance of the influence of K on I, one
Analysis of Steam Railway Dividends, 1890-1 941, ICC, Bureau of Transport Eco-
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should remember that K does not vary in the short run (one year, for
example) by more than a few percentage points. A final remark about (1)
is that the estimated time series of u, in addition to being nonautocorre-
lated, does not show any marked relationship to the business cycle pattern
or any other obvious economic series. There is, for example, practically
no relationship observable in a scatter diagram of u and the Federal
Reserve production index.
Equation (1) is, on statistical grounds, an acceptable explanation of
investment behavior in the railroad industry, but our empirical results
from a study of alternative hypotheses are worth presenting also. A. F.
Burns has suggested the introduction of the price index of railway capital
goods as a separate variable in addition to those already contained in (1) •23
Letus denote this price index by q, and set it equal to unity in the base
period 1910-14. The resulting equation is
(2) 1=2647 +0.88ir1—O.20K1—69i_1—301q_1 + u
(0.09) (0.02) (15) (128)
R=0.97 —=1.99
S2
In equation (2) the bond yield is arbitrarily lagged to show that the results
are not appreciably different from those of (1). The interest elasticity of
investment is, however, raised slightly, to —1.03 at the point of sample
means. The price elasticity of investment is —1.48 at the point of means.
On statistical grounds equation (2) is as satisfactory as (1). The
former, however, deviates from a principle that is observed in all the other
time series estimates: that all variables be independent of absolute prices.
Another reasonable hypothesis is that nonoperating income, exclusive
of interest charges, can influence investment. Nonoperating income may
have a positive effect because it represents a source of funds for capital
expenditures. On the other hand, it may have a negative effect on invest-
ment in road and equipment through its indication of earning power of
nonoperating assets. Our investment variable excludes expenditures on
assets not used in railway operations.
Another possibility is that the dividend policies of railroad corporations
may influence investment in the sense that dividend payments represent
funds that are specifically not available for capital expansion. We have not
introduced lagged dividends as a separate variable, however, since it is
correlated with past earnings. Tinbergen, in his second business cycle
volume, presents the interesting result that dividends are a function of
23Thissame price index enters (1) in a limited way as the deflator used in putting
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corporate earnings and of surplus (cumulated retained earnings) •24Thus
the surplus account gives a good indication of the ability to pay dividends
in such a way as not to impair the investment of earnings.
Let=netnonoperating income, deflated by a railroad construction
cost index, 1910-14:1.00.
W =endof year unappropriated surplus deflated by a railroad construc-
tion cost index, 19 10-14: 1.00.
A new estimate of our investment equation is given by
(3) 1 =1537+ —32i—0.14K1— + 0.03W1 + u
(0.06) (43) (0.04) (0.65) (0.07)
= 0.95 $51million
The coefficients of all variables except andK1 are unreliable. Twenty
annual observations are actually not enough to enable one to estimate six
parameters with much confidence.
Another revision of equation (1) that was considered was to add a
variable showing the liquidity position of the railroads. We used working
capital less materials and supplies to measure liquidity. The definitions
of current assets and current liabilities in the accounts reported to the ICC,
however, are not entirely satisfactory. Without getting more detailed inf or-
mation than was at our disposal, we were not able to include accrued tax
liabilities with current liabilities for all years during 1922-41. Further-
more, the ICC statistics on current liabilities included during the period
of our investigation a questionable item, principal of funded debt matured
but unpaid. During the period of large receiverships this item is substan-
tial. We have simply used working capital as defined in the ICC accounts
minus materials and supplies. The final figure was deflated by the railroad
construction cost index. If working capital, so defined, is introduced as a
separate variable in equation (1), the other coefficients remain practically
unchanged and working capital, defined in the same units as investment,
carries the negligible estimate of —0.006. During a great part of the period,
working capital is not even a positive quantity. The institutional frame-
work of railroad finance and investment should lead one to conclude, in
any case, that the current liquidity position is not as important for railroad
investment as it may be in other industries.
Offhand remarks about the substitution of capital for labor in railroad-
ing are commonly heard, but sound empirical investigations to check on
"In Corporate income Retention, 1915-43 (to be published by the NBER) S. Dobro-
voisky shows that time series of a sample of large manufacturing corporations,
19 16-43, produce a reliable estimate of the influence of surplus on corporate savings.
He obtains the same result in a cross-section study of the sample for 1940-41. How-
ever, a cross-section study for 1925-26 shows an insignificant influence of surplus
on corporate savings or dividends.256 PARTTWO
the reliability of such remarks are few. The interesting study mentioned in
note 17, however, shows the following results. During the interwar period
there was a strong upward trend for investment in maintenance of way
machinery and equipment per mile of main track. Cyclical fluctuations
about the trend were noticeable but slight. Average straight time hourly
earnings for track labor had a simultaneous upward trend since 1932. This
variable changed little from 1925 to 1931. There was also a great fall in
man-hours of track labor per mile of main track during the interwar period.
These concomitant events must not be considered in isolation from other
variables such as profits and traffic but they are suggestive. However, roads
that paid straight time hourly earnings for track labor at a level above 33
cents for the whole period show a much more strongly rising investment
(maintenance of way machinery and equipment) trend than do roads
paying less than 33 cents per hour for the whole period. The great depres-
sion had a greater retarding effect on the investment of the latter group.
Both groups of roads experienced a decrease in man-hours of track labor
during this period, but a much greater fraction of the decrease is attributed
to mechanization in the case of the high wage roads. They were also the
largest and most profitable roads; consequently, mechanization may have
occurred without the wage-cost stimulus.
We tried to compute a ratio of two unit costs that would show the over-
all desirability of substitution of capital for labor. Unit wage costs are
taken to be represented by average hourly earnings, and unit capital costs
by nonwage maintenance expenditures per car mile. Capital depreciation
is included in the maintenance accounts. Letting r =unitcapital costs
(cents per car mile) and w =unitwage costs (dollars per hour), we obtain
the estimates
(4) 1803 ±48L±u
(0.08) (19) (0.05) (38)W
The estimated coefficient of isunreliable and has a sign opposite to
what would be expected on the basis of substitution of capital for labor.
Equation (4) was reconsidered with a different series for the stock of
capital. Instead of the total stock of capital, we used the ratio of the stock
of capital to the number of car-miles. This gives us a measure of excess
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Again the sign of the estimated coefficient of the hypothesis
of mechanization through labor saving devices.
One might consider dropping asa variable from (5) and using the
resulting equation as an alternative to (1). In this case the results are not
entirely satisfactory because the estimated coefficient of i has a positive
sign. Equations (1) and (2) are the only formulations that are satisfac-
tory in all respects, economic and statistical. Equation (3) is a plausible
alternative, but wide margins of error surround some of the estimated
parameters of (3).
The basic sources of data for the time series studies are the official
reports of the railroads to the ICC. The ICC combines the individual
reports into tables of industry aggregates which it publishes annually in
Statistics of Railways. In many cases, however, adjustments and special
calculations must be made. Gross capital expenditures are taken from a
special ICC study,25 since they cannot be obtained in any simple way
from published balance sheets. Net railway operating income (before or
after recorded depreciation charges) and nonoperating income are readily
obtained from the income statements to the ICC. The stock of fixed capital
(road and equipment) as of January 1, 1940 valued at cost of reproduc-
tion is taken from a special report, by the ICC Bureau of Valuation.26
Balance sheet figures would not be desirable for this calculation. Annual
net investment is calculated from gross investment and depreciation, then
used to obtain a time series of capital stock starting out from the January
1940 base value. Book value includes only equipment depre-
ciation and voluntary road depreciation. As a consequence there is a sub-
stantial amount of unrecorded road depreciation that must be used in
estimating annual net investment, although this figure is not needed for
estimating net railway operating income before depreciation. A series on
unrecorded road depreciation can be obtained from another special study
by an ICC bureau.27 The construction cost index used for putting the
investment and capital variables in a constant price system is one prepared
regularly by the ICC Bureau of Valuation, and covers all cost items enter-
ing into expenditures for road and equipment. In calculating real net
investment, we should use separate deflators for gross investment and for
depreciation; instead we have used the deflator appropriate for gross
investment in the deflation of depreciation. The bond yield data represent
Postwar Capital Expenditures of th.e Railroads, ICC, Bureau of Transport Eco-
nomics and Statistics (March 1947).
Ex Parte No. 148, Exhibit No. A 11 (December 1942).
27Analysisof SteamRailway Dividends, 1890-1941, icc, Bureau of Transport Eco-
nomics and Statistics (November 1943).258 PART TWO
an average of the yields on practically all new long-term issues. The yield
for each new issue is weighted by the amount floated in that issue. We did
not use the average yield on outstanding issues in the time series study.
The yield data are regularly prepared by Moody's Investors Service. The
other variables used in this study so far were compiled from Statistics of
Railways.
The results of our time series study do not conifict seriously with Tin-
bergen's investigation, although they are not identical. Tinbergen covered
only the period before World War I, 1896-1913, for this country, while
we covered only the following period. There is great need for a study of
the past 50-75 years, but we did not feel that the investment data were yet
in a form to be used for such a long run study. Total railroad investment
considered as one component of gross capital formation in accounts like
those of the Department of Commerce is not yet available for years before
1919. Purchases of rolling stock are known for a longer period, but there
are theoretical difficulties in studyipg equipment purchases, in the manner
of Tinbergen, without studying road investment at the same time. Since
we conclude in this study that railroads tend to invest most of their profits,
the movement of any component of railroad investment in relation to
profits may be compensated by the movement of the other comp@nents in
relation to profits. If this is the case, an accurate picture can be obtained
only by considering all investment together. Tinbergen's study of equip-
ment investment attaches some importance to the rate of change of past
profits as well as to the level of past profits. It shows a higher elasticity for
the interest rate (average yield from a sample of 60 issues from all indus-
tries), but he concludes on the basis of studies in other countries that
the postwar elasticity may be substantially lower, reflecting a- changed
approach in the financing of railroad investment. He does not consider
the stock of capital explicitly in his railway study.
Tinbergen concludes that United States railroad investment in the past
depended more on profits, interest, and prices of capital goods than on the
technical acceleration principle —stockof capital proportional to traffic
and investment proportional to the rate of increase of traffic. European
countries seemed to differ in this respect. The acceleration principle is not
a very satisfactory explanation of investment behavior. It implies a special
production function, one that can be written in terms of output and stock
of capital atone. The present writer's statistical studies of an econometric
model for short-run railroad production decisions contradicts this assump-
tion flatly. One has only to call to mind the phenomenal traffic increases of
World War II with a practically unexpanded stock of fixed capital to
realize that the relations imposed by the acceleration principle are not
generally valid. It is possible that decade or other long-term investmentINVESTMENT 259
rather than annual investment can be more readily explained in terms of
the acceleration principle. This possibility needs empirical study, how-
ever, before we can judge its acceptability.
The basic data used for the study of investment carry us onl.y to the
end of the interwar period in 1941. The ICC study cited in note 25is
helpful for checking our findings in a rough way against more recent infor-
mation. In the middle of 1945 roads were requested to assume their 1941
net railway operating income and to estimate, on the basis of this assump-
tion, their proposed capital expenditures in the first three postwar years.
It is interesting to note that the question was asked and answered in this
form; it corresponds closely to our estimated investment function, although
we may suggest that other control variables should have been introduced
also. The actual expenditures in fiscal 1947 were $790 million as com-
pared with a survey estimate of $625millionfor the first postwar year. In
the SEC —Departmentof Commerce surveys, the replies of railroads have
consistently overestimated actual expenditures, but in these surveys there
is no income assumption.
During the war, facilities were used intensively with a minimum of
replacement and repair. The percentages of locomotives, freight cars, and
passenger cars over 25yearsold were much greater in 1945 than in 1941.
At the end of 1945 the railroads embarked on a program of capital expan-
sion that had some of its roots in the poor state of the existing stock of
capital. According to the ICC survey, the intentions were to spend 38.2 per
cent of the 3-year total in the first year, 32.7 per cent in the second year,
and 29.1 per cent in the third year. With a growing stock of capital and a
fixed operating profit, capital expenditures were expected to decline. The
same result would follow from equation (1) or (2). Most capital outlays
were intended for modernization to cut costs or permit higher speeds and
to provide greater safety. There was not much investment proposed to
enlarge over-all capacity except in so far as modernization automatically
does so. This reflects the maturity of the industry.
Working capital, minus materials and supplies, went up from $511
million in November 1941 to $1,320 million in August 1945, yet only
$125 million of the expected investment funds were to come from this
source. The schedule of capital financing showed 7.7 per cent from prior
accumulations, 62.6 per cent from current accumulations, and 27.7 per
cent from indebtedness. In our equation (1) principal considerations are
lagged profits (current accumulations) and bond yields (indebtedness).
None of the postwar investment was expected to be financed by issues of
capital stock and most of the indebtedness was expected to be from the
issuance of equipment trust certificates. This represents a projection of
prewar capital market conditions directly into the postwar situation.260 PART TWO
Statistics are available for an estimate of 1948 investment from equa-
tion (1)Theestimate can then be compared with realized investment
in 1948. The following data are used in the calculation:
net railway operating income in 1947 =$781million
depreciation charges in 1947 (road and equipment) =$353million
construction cost index in 1947 =2.57
construction cost index in 1948 =2.81
cost of reproduction of fixed capital, January 1, 1948 =$23,108million
average yield on new railroad bond issues in 1948 =3.64per cent.
From equation (1), we obtain
781 + 353 23,108
1=1596+0.75 —51(3.64)-—0.14 =483
2.57 2.57
Actual expenditures in current prices were estimated at $1,273 million by
the Association of American Railroads. When deflated by the construction
cost index, they become $453 million, a not unfavorable comparison with
483. There is some doubt about the comparability of the January 1, 1948
ICC estimate of the cost of reproduction of fixed capital and the estimates
used in the time series study. The recent figure is lower than that which
would be derived by attempting to cumulate annual net investment for-
ward from the January 1, 1940 estimate of the cost of reproduction. As
mentioned in note 28, however, some problems are raised by the acceler-
ated depreciation applied to wartime facilities and the revaluation of
current book value depreciation charges in checking on the comparability
of the two estimates. If the deflated cost of reproduction of fixed capital
were raised from the level of $8,991 million, the estimated capital expendi-
tures for 1948 would be reduced.
Equation (1) has also been extrapolated to 1947 by estimating the
value of K_1 from data on gross investment, depreciation, and the price
of capital goods in 1947. The estimated value of I as shown by (1) is
$500 million, which does not compare favorably with $337 million, the
deflated value of the actual expenditures estimated by the Association of
AmericanRailroads. This overestimate resembles that shown by the rail-
roadcomponent of the SEC-USDC surveys in 1947. Equation (2) does
Difficulties arise in extrapolating (1) to 1946 or 1947. The prewar estimate of the
stock of capital cannot easily be carried forward to 1946 or 1947 by cumulating the
net investment of the intervening years, because of a substantial amount of special
depreciation on the wartime investment. The definition offoran extrapolation to
1946 is obscure for the same reason. The January 1, 1948 estimate of the cost of
reproduction of fixed capital by the ICC cannot be satisfactorily carried back to
1947 or 1946 by subtracting net investment because the problem of revaluing depre-
ciation charges has become more urgent with the great postwar increase in prices of
capital goods. We have selected 1948 as the first 'normal' postwar year for which
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not extrapolate as well as (1) to 1948. Substitution of the observed values
of K_1,i_1, q1 into the equation shows an estimated investment expen-
diture of only $225 million.
The time series for some variables relevant to our problem do not exist
for periods as far distant as 1919-22; there is not a sufficiently long period
of observation of the available variables to study the behavior of 2- or
3-year investment expenditures; finally, some questions simply cannot be
well answered from time series. For these reasons, we now turn to an
examination of intercompany or spatial variations (cross-sectioh data)
to see whether some new light can be thrown on the problem of railroad
investment.
Twenty annual observations provide samples that are too small to treat
many variables simultaneously or to test explicitly the assumptions made
in statistical theory concerning the distribution of the random error, u, in
the stochastic equations. For individual interwar years, we have grouped
Class I railroads into systems of common ownership, and end up with
approximately 80-90 independent statistical observations for each group-
ing. Details are given in the Appendix. This procedure yields far more
degrees of freedom than 20 annual observations. In a separate study of
expenditures for fuel, current capital and manpower together with
a production function, we found that practically all the observations can
be used on a homogeneous basis for estimating the parameters of the
model. The relationships studied are stable and not too many variables
are needed to account for the most important systematic differences among
the roads. However, the situation isquite as favorable with regard to
investment. Here the intercompany differenáes appear to be much greater
and the behavior pattern is undoubtedly less uniform or stable. Bankrupt
railroads invest according to a pattern that differs markedly from other
railroads. Small roads are much more erratic in their investment decisions
than large roads. Some variables are not available for all companies. The
result is that we can make our best cross-section studies with 35-40 inde-
pendent observations, many more than were used in the time series study
but many less than were used in the cross-section production study. The
samples are unfortunately not large enough to make accurate tests of the
underlying distributional hypotheses.
The general theory of the treatment of economic data obtained from
cross-section samples is not as highly developed as time series analysis.
For this reason we should discuss a few general principles that are involved
in cross-section analysis. We must devote a few lines also to the difficult
problems of comparing estimates made independently from cross-section
and time series data.
Cross-section data refer directly to individual units; i.e., they are a part262 PART TWO
of micro-economic analysis. In many problems this is important in singling
out directions of cause and effect among the several factors involved, for
there are many variables that are given to the individual but are not given
for aggregative market demand and supply. In economic theofy individual
units are assumed to adapt their behavior to market prices, wages, and
interest rates, but aggregates of individual units affect these market vari-
ables as well as being affected by them. In the present case of the analysis
of investment behavior these particular points are less important because
of the substantial lag of investment behind the causal factors, and because
of the nature of the capital market as discussed above in connection with
equation (1).
The cross-section analyses based on family budget inquiries have usually
assumed that market variables such as prices are held constant throughout
the sample. This assumption seems questionable; prices paid do vary
geographically, by income level, and by other characteristics. Some, but
not all, of the price variation can be accounted for by the fact that the
individual units in the cross-section sample purchase different commodi-
ties. In the cross-section sample of railroads many prices and unit costs
are not held constant. One of the central problems in our cross-section
studies is whether market rates are held constant in the samples
used. The actual bond yields calculated for the individual carriers show
substantial variation in 1936, reflecting the differences in risks attached to
each road looked upon as a debtor. If all the companies appeared equally
risky to lenders, 'pure' interest charges might not vary in the sample, but
we do not claim to measure the effect of 'pure' interest, a subjective con-
cept, on investment. Instead we are attempting to measure the effect of the
objectively calculated market interest rates on investment. The bond yields
that are used as variables in the analysis include charges for pure interest
and risk. For our purposes this does not mean that observed bond yields
are indicators of the cost of different commodities. We view them as costs
of a dollar of loan funds, each dollar being a homogeneous commodity for
each carrier. Only whena road becomes bankrupt, is forced to pay virtu-
ally infinite interest rates for capital funds, and is required to submit its
properties to court reorganization do we recognize a difference in kind.
The explanatory variables introduced in time series analysis are used
to account for the differences in some other variables from one period to
another. We may say, in a sense, that the explanatory variables attempt to
put the different periods on a homogeneous basis with regard to the other
variables. A similar thing must be done in the cross-section analysis.
Explanatory variables must be introduced to account for the differences
in investment among the several roads. Many variables may be required
to put the different companies on a homogeneous basis in regard to theirINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 263
investment outlays. In the cross-section studies from family budget data,
rarely are more than two or three variables considered simultaneously, yet
a larger number of variables would seem to be needed to account for the
differences among individual units. A fundamental point to be kept in
mind for cross-section analysis is that many variables must be treated
simultaneously.
Suppose that each road invests according to some pattern that can be
expressed as an equation containing a manageable number of parameters.
The parameters need not be the same for each unit. It can be shown, in the
linear case, that the time series aggregates for the whole industry are line-
arly related in terms of parameters that are averages of the parameters
of the individual relationsSimilarly,it can be shown that the relation
estimated from a cross-section sample is an average of the individual rela-
tions, and that the parameters of the former relation are averages of the
individual parameters. The interesting thing is that the averages.in cross-
section and time series analysis have different weighting systems and differ-
ent components in general. When comparing time series estimates with
cross-section estimates one must keep this possible source of divergence
in mind. To get the same results from both methods the problem is to
introduce enough correct variables to put the different individual units
and periods on as homogeneous a basis as possible. This procedure should
make the parameters of the individual relations as alike as possible and
will tend to minimize the differences between the average parameters esti-
mated from time series and from cross-section data.
The data used for individual roads come from balance sheets, income
statements, or operating reports published in Statistics of Railways; special
studies by ICC bureaus; schedules in the original reports of the roads to
the ICC; reports issued by associations in the industry; and the files of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. Statistics on net railway operat-
ing income, recorded depreciation, nonoperating income, unappropriated
surplus, working capital, dividends, train-hours, and car-miles are readily
found in Statistics of Railways. The reproduction costs of the stock of
capital in road and equipment as of certain dates are taken from special
studies by the ICC Bureau of Valuation. Data on the age distribution of
railway cars are published by the American Railway Car Institute, and
bond yields on individual railroad securities are èomputed by the Financial
Research Project from material prepared by W. B. Hickman of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Project. The
principal variable of the analysis, gross capital expenditures, is the most
difficult to obtain and requires the most detailed discussion.
See L. R. Klein, 'The Use of Cross-Section Data in Econometrics' (NBER, 1949;
mimeographed).264 PART TWO
Railroad accounting procedures are such that the difference between
two successive, year-end balance sheet figures for the undepreciated road
and equipment accounts does not give a good estimate of gross capital
expenditures. This difference is closer to gross expenditures (at the installa-
tion stage) minus retirements, and the latter item can be very large for
individual companies in individual years. In a separate schedule of the
reports to the ICC, debits to the road and equipment asset accounts are
separated from retirements but the sum of the net debit items does not quite
meet our specifications on the definition of gross investment in property
used for transportation. It includes accounting adjustments that may have
little to do with current investment outlays. The adjustments may be cor-
rections of previous accounting errors, or may be pure transfers between
the road and equipment asset accounts and other asset accounts. In case
freight cars are retired from the service of carrying goods and used as work
train equipment, there is a credit to retirements and a debit to expenditures
for additions and betterments. There is often no way of recognizing this
debit item, and it gets included with the total net debits to the road and
Chart4
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equipmentasset accounts (exclusive of retirement credits). Accounting
adjustments over $50,000 must be described in the reports; therefore it is
usually possible to tell whether an entry represents an actual expenditure,
an account transfer, or some other accounting adjustment. The larger
roads are more likely to describe their adjustments than the small compa-
nies who do not have many individual transactions in these accounts over
$50,000. For this reason the data are probably more accurate for the
larger roads.
The gross investment concept for an industry or a whole economy
excludes many intercompany transactions, but in dealing with individual
firms we must regard the purchase of a durable asset of one company by
another as an act of investment by the latter. One disturbing type of entry
in the schedule of investment expenditures in the railroad reports is that
which comes under the heading 'cost of road purchased'. The valuations
are sometimes spurious in this subaccount, and the treatment of mergers
is questionable. We have followed the practice of omitting companies
involved in mergers or attempting to exclude the merger valuations from
investment expenditures. The latter step is logical when the merger is
between a Class I road and a company outside this class and therefore
outside our analysis.
The Association of American Railroads receives special reports from
the individual companies on their out of pocket capital outlays for road
and equipment. These data would be far more suitable for our purposes
but unfortunately are not made available to the public except as an ann.ual
aggregate for all firms. The time series of annual aggregates is presented
in Chart 1.
A rough sketch, subject to many qualifications, of the intercompany
investment-profit pattern can be seen from the logarithmic Charts 4-7.
Investment and profits are plotted for four periods, with the logarithm of
gross investment on the vertical axis and the logarithm of the preceding
year's net railway operating income before depreciation on the horizontal
axis. Naturally, the few roads with negative net railway operating income
before depreciation are excluded.30 Roads in receivership or trusteeship
are marked x.
In a cross-section study there is an important variable which may not
show up as significantly in a time series study, namely, the size of the unit.
Large roads make large profits and large investments; small roads make
small profits and small investments; hence it is difficult to get a true picture
of the investment-profit relation from the charts. The logarithmic transfor-
'°Theseroads are usually either jointly owned by two major systems, each making




Log Net RaUway Operating Income Before Depreciation, 1935
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mation does make a correction for size, but it is a monotonic transforma-
tion, leaving the correction incomplete. However, one striking feature of
the four charts must be taken into account for the ensuing analysis. During
periods of large scale bankruptcies, 1935-36, 1936-37, and 1939-40, the
charts show that receivership or trusteeship companies invest at a higher
rate for a given profit status than do solvent companies, on the average.31
The institutional background of this observation was discussed previously,
and if the reader combines this discussion with the patterns exhibited in
the charts, he will see that at least one point is illustrated —accessto the
31Afew statistics on Chart 5 may serve to reassure the reader on this point. Residuals
from the least-squares line, log——0.054± 0.93 8 log havea zero mean and
standard error of estimate, S =0.417.The mean residual of the 19 observations
for companies in receivership or trusteeship is +0.232. Assuming all residual ob-
servations to come from a population with a common variance, we can test whether
the calculated mean of +0.232 is significantly greater than the mean of the other
70 residuals, —0.232. If the estimate of the population standard deviation is 0.417,
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capitalmarket is an important consideration in railroad investment. Roads
in reorganization proceedings can, as pointed out above, argue for added
reductions in fixed charges in order to modernize and put operations on a
profitable basis once again. This means that they have a ready source of
funds for capital outlays. Furthermore, a reorganized road can offer very
attractive securities to the market. Since much of the old debt structure is
canceled, the reorganized companies can offer first mortgage bonds to
prospective lenders.
The profit elasticity of investment, as estimated by the slopes of the
simple log-log regressions, varies approximately from 0.8 to 1.0, while the
mean elasticity of equation (1) in the time series study is approximately
1.4. The two types of estimate differ significantly. If one proceeds, at the
next stage, to introduce some of the same variables as were used in the
time series study, difficulties immediately arise. The stock of capital, mea-
sured by the reproduction cost of road and equipment, is so highly inter-
correlated with the profit variable that no reliable results can be obtained.








correlation;hence the two former variables cannot be considered as inde-
pendent. If we arbitrarily fix the estimate of the profit elasticity in the
logarithmic cross-section study at 1.4 to agree with the time series estimate,
and correlate log 137 —1.4logwith log K3G, the least-squares estimate
of the coefficient of the latter variable is negative, though less absolutely
than the mean capital elasticity of the time series study. In the cross-
section study the stock of capital plays a dual role: it exerts a positive
effect on investment through its measure of the investing unit, and a nega-
tive effect through its measure of capital accumulation and existing capac-
ity. Many alternative formulations in the logarithmic cross-section study
have been computed with as many as eight variables simultaneously, but
we have been able to get little more information from them than is con-
tained in the charts.
However, one additional calculation with the logarithmic cross-section
data does show an interesting result concerning the choice of variables to
be contained in our investment equation. It often happens in econometric
investigations that several hypotheses are consistent with the same set of
Log
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observations. In such cases one might investigate independent samples or
use information such as that provided by a priori economic knowledge in
order to make a final choice of hypotheses. At a very early stage of our
study, it was obvious that investment would be as highly correlated with
total traffic (output) as with operating income; thus it appeared that the
data would not enable us to distinguish between two hypotheses. This
result showed up in both the cross-section and the time series data. Traffic
and operating income are closely related, the latter variable being defined
as traffic revenues minus operating costs (both in constant prices). One
immediate reason for attempting to develop relations using operating
income rather than traffic as a variable was that the former variable is
more general than the latter since it includes traffic and other variables
that influence investment decisions. Operating income is a concept that
provides an extremely useful summary of many items, all of which affect
investment, and does so with a minimum loss of degrees of freedom in esti-
mating the parameters of the desired relationship.
In the cross-section study there are more observations in the sample;
hence the problem of avoiding a loss of degrees of freedom is not as urgent
as in the time series study. We have carried out a calculation in which the
logarithm of revenues and the logarithm of costs are introduced as sepa-
rate variables to see whether revenues, revenues and costs individually, or
operating income would give the best statistical relationship. This calcula-
tion must be described at some length because it, at the same time, involves
an attempt to integrate a separate study of the production of railroad ser-
vices with the study of investment behavior. We shall not assume a lag
between investment, revenues, and costs; therefore revenues and costs
have to be simultaneously explained in terms of other variables that are
not influenced by current investment. Revenues actually are not explained
in terms of predetermined variables because it is assumed that an indi-
vidual carrier passively adjusts its current operations to the given volume
of traffic. However, in making this adjustment the carriers do have to
decide about the current levels of input factors, which are the components
of operating costs.
From the production study we adopt the following model estimated
from cross-section data of 1936. Let
net ton-miles of freight
=netpassenger-miles
n =man-hours
ctons of fuel (coal equivalents)
d =train-hours
Zi =averagelength of haul
Z2 =percentageof freight carried in the form of products of mines270 PARTTWO
w =averagehourly earnings
q =averageprice of fuel per ton
r =nonwagemaintenance per train-hour
(6) =5.62x2°'6n°89 c°'2 d°28 Zi034 Z2025
(7)
(8)
Equation (6) is a production function (joint output) and (7)-(8) are
conditionsof cost minimization. Equations (7) and (8) are formally
derived by minimizing wn + qc + rd subject to (6), with x1, x2, w, q, r,
Zi, Z2 assumed to be given variables to which the individual roads adapt
n, c, d. The observations of the variables for all individual Class I steam
railways in 1936 fit this model except for deviations that fit a trivariate
logarithmic normal distribution. For each road in 1936 nn° was com-
puted by substituting the observed values of x1, x2, w, q, r, Zi, Z2 into
(6)- (8). Since operating costs are given by wn + qc + rd =wn(1
+ 0.1349 + 0.3 124), estimated costs for each road are taken as propor-
tional town°.32 We next estimate the equation





where p1x1 + p2x2 =dollarsof operating revenue
i =averageyield on outstanding bonds, excluding equip-
ment trust certificates, measured in percentages.
For this calculation there are 43 observations —asmany companies as
are contained in the National Bureau of Economic Research sample of
railroad bond yields. The sample consists mainly of large solvent carriers.
We come now to the interpretation of this statistical result. First, rev-
enues carry a positive coefficient and costs a negative coefficient, as one
would expect; however, both estimates are subject to large sampling errors,
primarily because of the close intercorrelation between revenues and costs..
But the coefficient of revenues just meets a statistical significance test at
the 5 per cent level. None of the variables show strong enough statistical
significance to account for the high correlation. The sum of the coefficients
of log (p1x1 + p2x2) andlog wn° (2.12—1.10 =1.02)is of specialimpor-
tancetous, and is highly significant in the statistical sense. The sampling
error of the sum depends on the variance of each Individual coefficient and
their covariance. It is estimated to be 0.08.
32This would make log wn° differ from the logarithm of estimated costs by a
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There is no unique mathematical relation between the logarithm of
(positive) profits and the logarithm of revenues and the logarithm of costs,
although they do roughly provide the same information. In other words,
there is no unique relation between profits and the ratio of revenues to
costs. There is, however, a basic property of a profit variable that we may
expect our analogue in ratio form to possess. If unit receipts and unit costs
all change in any given proportion, profits also change in that same pro-
portion. We say that profits have homogeneity of degree unity in prices
and unit costs. If receipts and costs are expressed in ratio form, and if this
ratio is to have the same homogeneity property, the exponent of the
numerator must be larger by unity than the exponent of the denominator.
In the symbols of our equation, we write
(p1x1+p2x2)' + a
or(1 + a) log (p1x1 + p2x2) —alog (wn°) (wn )a
asa profit variable in our investment equation. This is analogous also to
the ordinary profit variable in that it requires only one parameter to relate
it to investment. We find in the calculation for equation (9), where log
(p1x1 + p2x2) and log (wn°) are introduced as separate variables, that
their coefficients add up to unity (significantly), as would be expected in
case profits were the relevant variable. The parameter a is not reliably
estimated in equation (9), largely because of the high intercorrelation
involved; we try to correct for this by considering the relation between log
land log irinthe preceding charts.
• To summarize: Both the logarithm of revenues and the logarithm of
operating income show strong empirical relations with the logarithm of
investment. When the logarithms of revenues and of costs are introduced
as separate variables, they exhibit a relation to the logarithm of investment
that suggests operating income as the relevant variable. We prefer the
evidence obtained from the last mentioned relation because it is a more
general relation than the other two, even though the high intercorrelation
between revenues and costs prohibits its being used for the final result in
estimating all parameters.
An essentially different approach has been investigated in treating the
sample of cross-section data. Since it is evident that a size variable is
correlated with other independent variables, we have corrected for size
by means of a deflation process and used a size correction that is not the
same thing as the stock of capital. For 1937 we selected train-hours, a
measure of the flow of capital services, as a divisor of all size influenced
variables.
I =grossinvestment measured in dollars per train-hour
net railway operating income before depreciation measured in dollars
per train-hour272 PART TWO
K =reproductioncost of road and equipment measured in dollars per
train-hour
a =percentageof freight and passenger cars less than 20 years old
iaverage yield on outstanding bonds, excluding equipment trust cer-
tificates, measured in percentages
=netnonoperating income, excluding fixed charges, measured in dol-
lars per train-hour
W =unappropriatedsurplus measured in dollars per train-hour
Subscripts attached to 1, i,andindicatethe year during which they
occur; subscripts attached to K, a, and W, the year-end date at which they
occur, Hickman's sample of bond yields is more complete for every fourth
year, of which 1936 is one. The yield data refer to the first quarter of the
year.
An equation similar to (1) of the time series study is
(10) =19.13+ O.53IT36 —0.08i30—0.02K30—O.l5a36+ U
(0.14) (1.19) (0.02) (0.11)
= 0.55 =$11.6per train-hour
In this calculation there are 37 observations, including all roads with bond
issue quotations in Hickman's sample except those in receivership or
trusteeship, those operated as parts of foreign systems, and those failing to
report the age of their equipment. The resulting sample covers all the major
railways not in bankruptcy.
We have modified equation (1) by introducing the age as well as the
size of the capital stock. Our particular age variable excludes locomotives
and road property, yet it is indicative of the state of. a major part of equip-
ment. Time series for this variable do not exist for very long periods. The
only variable which has definite statistical significance isThisis true
in all the cross-section samples of this study. The upper range of a 95 per
cent confidence interval surrounding the estimate of the coefficient of ir
coversat least the lower range of the corresponding interval of the time
series study. In this respect there is no contradiction. The estimate of the
coefficient of i is very uncertain and provides neither confirmation nor
contradiction of our previous result. It must be remembered, though, that
i is measured in the same units in both studies, while the mean value of
investment per train hour is about 16.1 as compared with a mean in the
time series study of 319.0. After correction for units of measurement
95 per cent confidence intervals from the two studies overlap, but this
finding is not particularly meaningful in view of the uncertainty involved
in the cross-section study. Bond yields range from 2.9 to 13.4 in the sample
during 1936 so that the insignificant estimate cannot be attributed to a
lack of intercompany variation in this particular year. In equation (10),
i has a different meaning than in equation (1), being the yield on outstand-INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 273
ing rather than new issues. The estimate of the coefficient of K36 carries
uncertainty also, but much less than in the case of i36. The extreme upper
range, 95 per cent, of the estimate of the coefficient of K36 does not even
overlap with the extreme lower range, 95 per cent, of the same coefficient
in (1). It is not expected that cross-section estimates will agree with time
series estimates in every pair of samples, but there are some specific reasons
why we may get the discrepancy noted here. The influence of capital stock,
as an indicator of capacity and capital accumulation, on investment may
be fundamentally different on an individual and on an aggregative basis.
In the latter case, the stock of capital of the whole industry influences the
investment of the whole industry. In the former case, both the firm and
the industry (or regional) stock of capital may influence the investment
of the single firm. This is the point made inTNEC cross-section studies
referred to above (see note 8). The reason for this is that the existing
capacity of several competitors, in addition to a carrier's own capacity,
may affect the need for capital expansion and thus influence individual
investment decisions. In dealing with industry totals, these effects get
mixed. The time series relation may be looked upon as an aggregation
of individual time relationships in which the coefficient of the capital stock
represents two separate effects on investment —theinfluence of each indi-
vidual's capacity on his investment and the influence of the industry's (or
competitor's) capacity on his investment. In a cross-section sample indus-
try variables are held constant, and we are measuring only a part of the
effect of capital on investment. Another point in the reconciliation with
the time series results is that the estimate of the coefficient of K36 is not
independent of the estimate of the coefficient of a36. Both variables tend
to show some of the same phenomena, although their empirical correlation
is a small negative value in this sample. The age distribution of capital does
make for separate intercompany differences and should not be left out of
the cross-section study, however. The intercorrelation between andK36
that upset the logarithmic relation is not as significant in the size deflated
formulation. In the present sample, = 0.39,while the multiple
correlation in (10) is as large as 0.55.
The interest rate has a negligible effect in all formulations of the cross-
section relations. Dropping i36 and adding 7r'36andW36, we get:
(11) 137 =22.83+ 0.457r36 —0.03K36—0.17a36—
(0.14) (0.02) (0.10) (0.60)
+0.04W36 + U
(0.03)
R=0.56 S =$11.4per train-hour
These results look similar to those of equation (3) in the time series study,
and the statistical significance of andW36 remains doubtful.274 PART TWO
The residual variation of (11), u, is estimated in the accompanying
distribution. There are not enough degrees of freedom in the sample to
test this distribution for normality.
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Two years' observations on I, ir, andin conjunction with the same
values for K, a, W, and i lead to more stable estimates for some variables.
(12) =32.27+ —0.04K36—0.27a36
(0.10) (0.03) (0.15)
— + 0.08W36 —0.19i36+ u
(0.52) (0.06) (1.93)
R0.60 S =$15.90per train-hour
There are only 36 observations in this sample because the 1936 investment
figure for the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company contains some
doubtful adjustments. The 2-year analogue of (11), excluding i36 from
(12), is given by
(13) 136+37 =31.05+ —0.04K36—0.27a36
(0.12) (0.03) (0.15)
(\A A F I1\ I — U.M'+7r35+36 T U
(0.51) (0.05)
=0.62 S =$15.64per train-hour
Comparison of (12) and (13) shows the insensitivity of the estimates to
the inclusion or exclusion of i. In the 2-year study the over-all correlation
goes up and some variables show more statistical significance. We have
not investigated the further possibilities of 3-5 year, cross-section invest-
ment samples. A further interesting property of the .2-year analysis is that
the distribution of residuals becomes even more symmetric and 'normal'
in appearance. This is important and should not be made secondary to
high correlation as econometricians have tended to do in the past. The new
distribution is
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We have tried to check some of our findings by examining a year of theINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 275
1920's during which there was substantial investment. Our choice is 1928
because this is a year in which quadrennial data on bond yields are avail-
able, although we could have selected 1929 as well and used a lag for this
variable as was done in 1937. We are not able to obtain estimates of all
the same data in 1928 as in 1936-37. There are no cost of reproduction
data for which to measure K27 for most roads. The age distribution of
freight and passenger cars is not available in the same form. We have been
forced to use instead the following approximation to a27: the ratio of
installations during the seven years 1921-27 to freight and passenger
equipment owned on December 31, 1927. Car-miles were used to measure
size in place of train-hours. The latter are not available in 1928.
Bond yields, as estimated from the National Bureau sample, show
extremely small dispersion in 1928. There are 52 observations between
4.2 and 5.8 per cent, and 3 scattered observations at 6.2, 6.9, and 7.6 per
cent. For all practical purposes we 'may consider this variable as fixed in the
1928 cross-section sample. In this year there are yield quotations for 'more
of the smaller roads, and if we take again, as a sample of analysis, all
roads reporting bond yields, we find that the small roads have such erratic
investment patterns that any general relationship is obscured. In multiple
and simple correlation computations, no variable shows any statistically
significant relation to investment. If, however, we limit the sample to the
39 largest roads, all having more than 100,000,000 car-miles, some of the
familiar patterns emerge.
The most significant variables in 1927-28 areand a27. The estimated
relation is
(14) '28 =0.0055+ 0.467r27 —0.008a27+ u
(0.15) (0.011)
=0.41 =0.013.tensof dollars per car-mile
The coefficient of a27 cannot be readily compared with that of a36 because
of the differences in definitions. The mean value of '28 is 0.0202.
The results in (14) are not appreciably affected by the inclusion of 7r'27
and in the analysis, but these two variables have coefficients opposite
in sign from those obtained for and W36 and the corresponding vari-
ables in the time series analysis. The estimates are subject to sufficiently
large errors so that the signs are not significant. If we use book values for
the stock of capital as a substitute for estimates of reproduction cost we
get contradictory results, a small positive coefficient subject to an error
less than one-half the estimate. We do not accept the book value data as
reliable, however.
A final check upon the 1936-37 cross-section results has been made
from a study of 1939-40 data. This period was chosen because estimates
of reproduction cost of road and equipment are available as of January 1,276 PART TWO
1940. The only point that is unequivocally made in this final check is a
confirmation of the profits-investment relation. An equation like (14) for
the more recent period is estimated as
(15) =—1.54+ 0.577r39 —0.02a30+ u
(0.09) (0.06)
R=0.72 S =$9.31per train-hour
In this calculation roads in receivership or trusteeship were excluded, and
of the remainder, the 37 largest systems, all having 'more than 31,000
train hours, were used. The variable a39 measures the percentage of freight
cars less than 20 years old on January 1, 1940. Roads not reporting such
data are also excluded. The estimate of the coefficient of a39 is unreliable,
and nothing definite can be said about the effect of this variable in 1940.
A similar result holds for other variables such as W39, and This
can be seen immediately from




= 0.69 =$9.71per train-hour
The estimates in (16) tell us little; they neither confirm nor contradict the
results of the 1936-37 investigation or the time series analysis. There is
some non-negligible intercorrelation among the variables in (16). The
correlation andK39 is as large as 0.51. The results of (16) are
not affected in any essential way if net railway operating income after
depreciation is used as a measure ofin(16). These values ofare
smaller than those used in (16) and, of course, take a larger coefficient
in a linear equation.
While we must remain in doubt about some matters, interesting con-
clusions can be drawn from all the pieces of information. First, there can
be no doubt about the influence of profit on investment. This effect shows
up clearly in both the time series and cross-section data. Second, lower
interest charges stimulate investment. Bond yields show a definite effect
in the time series study, although the absolute value of the interest elasticity
is low. Bond yields do not show a statistically significant effect in the cross-
section data, and in one case this may be partly attributed to a small vari-
ance in the sample. The high investment of bankrupt companies seen in
the cross-section data is additional evidence of the influence of interest
charges on investment. Third, the stock of capital appears to have depress-
ing effect on investment. This shows up in the time series calculation, but
we cannot be certain that its effect is not confused with that of other trend
variables. It is interesting, however, that the statistical significance showsINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 277
up in this study where gross investment is the main variable. Previously,
the stock of capital had been studied in relation to net investment. The
cross-section data are ambiguous on its influence. This variable has some
limited influence in the 1936-37 data but it is not significant at the 5per
cent level. The data are not satisfactory for 1927-28, and the estimates
are quite unreliable for 1939-40. The age of capital (related to the size)
shows more definite influence in 1936-37, less in 1927-28, and still less
in 1939-40. All in all, there is substantial but inconclusive evidence that
capital accumulation has a depressing effect on further investment. Fourth,
the investment pattern seems to be somewhat more stable on a 2- than on
a 1-year basis. The stability was tested only from the cross-section data, all
of which imply that investment behavior patterns have a large erratic
component which varies inversely with the size of the investing unit.
Finally, the systematic role of other variables in railway investment deci-
sions remains dubious. Nonoperating income and surplus are not statis-
tically significant in any of the samples. The directions of their influence
vary from sample to sample. At various stages of the research work giving
rise to this paper several other variables were considered, but none show
any statistical significance.
3 ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
One peculiarity of the raihoad industry, as pointed out above, is its matu-
rity relative to other industries of the United States economy. It is an
interesting question to ask whether our statistical results are sufficiently
general to extend to growing youthful industries. A logical choice for
empirical study and comparison is the electric light and power industry.
It is certainly a growing industry, and it is comparable with railroads
because of its public service and regulatory nature. A further likeness to
railroading is that electric light and power companies invest in highly dura-
ble goods for which interest considerations could be of some importance.
We have not made a detailed study of the electric utility industry as we
did for railroads; consequently our knowledge of its institutional charac-
teristics is very limited. We have merely attempted to assemble a usable set
of time series for the interwar period and estimate the parameters of an
equation taking the same form as (1). The quality of the data is distinctly
inferior to that of the railroad statistics. For the period since 1926 we
used statistics compiled by the Edison Electric Institute on net operating
income and depreciation. The income data were extrapolated to 1919 on
the basis of the industry estimates of Simon Kuznets.33 A defect of his esti-
mates, for our purposes, is that they include some nonoperating income.
The Census of Electrical Industries provides estimates of the value of plant
income and its Co,nposition, 1919-1938 (NBER, 1941), pp. 659-713.278 PART TWO
and equipment in central electric light and power establishments in 1917,
1922, and 1927. We assumed that depreciation in 1917 and in 1922 was
in the same ratio to the physical asset valuation as in 1927. Intervening
years are estimated by linear interpolation. Gross investment, 1921-36,
is taken from the well known study of George Terborgh,34 and extended
to 1937-41 from estimates published in the Survey of Current Business,
May 1949. A price index for electric utility plant and equipment expendi-
tures is published regularly in the Engineering News-Record. Other con-
struction cost indexes are available for public utilities. We merely selected
an index that covers both plant and equipment items and is widely used
in the electric light and power industry. We did not use a special index for
the revaluation of depreciation charges. An initial value for the stock of
capital was not used in this time series study because there is no basic
revaluation study converting book values into costs of reproduction.
Instead, we include the initial stock of capital in the constant term of our
linear equation and use cumulations of net investment from a zero origin
as a measure of the capital stock. All parameters except the constant term
are unaffected by this procedure. Finally, yields on new issues of utility
bonds are estimated by Moody's Investors Service.
The notation will be exactly the same as that used in the railroad study,
but all variables now refer to the electric light and power industry. The
estimated equation, 1921-41, is




R=O.79 S=$77.23 million (1911 prices) 1.40
Thecorrelation is not especially high, but this is in keeping with our views
on both the accuracy of the data used and the volatilityof investment,
particularlyin a growing industry where investment decisions are not
routine.The nonautocorrelation of the residual variation is acceptable at
a 5 per cent level of significance, but the time shape of the residuals does
leave something to be desired. They seem to contain a wavelike movement,
and more intensive analysis of the industry's investment process is called
for. There is some suggestion in the residual pattern that our profit-invest-
ment lag is not entirely suitable. Perhaps both current and past gross oper-
ating income should be variables in the investment equation for the electric
light and power industry. We have not extended our calculations to this
case, however, because the introduction of current operating income into
the equation raises the problem of constructing a larger model to explain
this variable as well as investment. Such further work would carry us too
far afield.
EstimatedExpendituresfor New DurableGoods,1919-1938, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, September1939,p. 732.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
Chart 8
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(17) I1054 +2.O3ir_1 — i46i — 0.37K_1 + u280 PART TWO
The coefficients in (17) are all large in absolute value as compared with
the estimates in (1). Although profit is an important variable in (17), it
does not show the same stability with respect to investment as in the rail-
road study. In the present case the estimate of the profit coefficient is
sensitive to the omission or inclusion of i and K_1. The gross correlation
between yr_iandI is negative. There is no a priori reason why the marginal
propensity to invest out of gross operating profits should be less than unity,
but I feel uncomfortable about the size of the estimate of this parameter
in (17). The interest-elasticity of investment at the point of means is 2.79.
In this industry, there appears to be a statistically significant relation
between interest and investment which is not negligible in magnitude. This
is a likely event in a growing industry. Equation (17) provides another
example of the depressing effect of capital accumulation on investment.
In equation (17) there is high intercorrelation between gross operating
income and the stock of capital. This relation is probably induced by regu-
lations limiting profits in the industry to a 'fair' rate of return. Throughout
the 1920's there is a very strong linear relation betweenandK, then all
the observations fall below the line of relationship, as though the depression
conditions of the 1930's cut profits below a 'normal' or 'fair' return.
A slight revision of (17) was computed by introducing the lagged price
of capital goods as a separate variable, thus casting the equation into the
form of an analogue of (2) above. However, in this industry prices show
a statistically significant positive effect instead of the expected negative
effect. We reject this formulation. Another alternative has also been con-
sidered. Utilities are known to have had greater access than railroads
to the market for equity capital;35 so we replace gross operating income by
an average yield on utility shares. The latter variable shows jointly the
influence of profitability and of availability of equity funds on investment.
At the same time we lag the bond yield variable (for the sake of variety)
and use another measure of the existing stock of capital, total generating
capacity 'measured in kilowatts. Capacity may be a superior measure as
compared with the stock of capital in the sense that it takes account of both
price and quality changes. Share yields are taken from Alfred Cowles'
Common Stock Indexes for 1921-38 and from Moody's Investors Service
for 193 9-40. The Edison Electric Institute prepares statistics of generating
capacity. The estimated equation, 1922-4 1, is
(18) 1 =1459— —58L1—24C_1+ u
(9) (21) (3)
R=O.89 S=$57.54million (1911 prices) 1.38
where s =shareyield in peicentages, and C =generatingcapacity in mil-
lions of kilowatts. This is not a definitive result because the residual varia-
See Irwin Friend, op. cit.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
Chart 9
Electric Light and Power, 1922 — 1941
(18)I =1459—50s_1 — 58L.1 — 24C_1 +u
281
tion, while passing a significance test for lack of serial correlation, does
not appear to be entirely random. These results are on a par with those in
(17). Bond yields have a smaller influence in (18), yet remain statistically
significant. It is interesting to see the effect of share yields on investment
in the electric utility industry.
One should not draw a hasty generalization from the studies of railway
and electric utility investment that interest rates affect investment in other
highly durable producer goods in the same way. Railroads and electric
utilities are in a sheltered position that enable them to plan over a long
horizon. There is no compelling reason for them to amortize capital expen-
ditures over 5-10 years when the service lives of goods are much longer.
In other industries the effective horizon may be much shorter than the
life of the capital goods purchased, and working capital or other internal





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 PostwarCapital Expenditures of the Railroads, ICC, Bureau of Transport Eco-
nomics and Statistics, Washington, D.C., March 1947, p. 35.
2Statisticsof Railways.
3 Same as 2.
4 Analysis of Steam Railway Dividends, 1890-1 941, ICC, Bureau
Economics and Statistics, November 1943, p. 95.
of Transport
5 Railroad Construction Indices, ICC, Bureau of Valuation, August 1, 1942.
6 Moody's, Railroads, 1946, Moody's Investors Service, p. a49.
7Profit and loss balance, Statisticsof Railways.
8 Other income minus miscellaneous deductions,Statisticsof Railways.
9Sameas2.
10 Same as 2.
11 Thor Hultgren, American Transportation in Prosperity and
l948),p.184
12 Same as 2.
13Same as 2.
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CLASS I STEAM RAILWAYS, 1928
1Bangor and Aroostook R.R. Co.
2Boston and Maine R.R.
3Canadian National System
aChicago, Detroit and Canada Grand Trunk Junction R.R. Co.
bAtlantic and St. Lawrence R.R. Co.
cCentral Vermont Railway Co.
dDetroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway Co.
eGrand Trunk Western Railway Co.
1Duluth, Winnipeg and Pacific Railway Co.
4Canadian Pacific System
aCanadian Pacific Lines in Maine
bCanadian Pacific Lines in Vermont
cDuluth, South Shore and Atlantic Railway Co.
dMinneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.
eSpokane International Railway Co.
5Maine Central R.R. Co.
6New Haven System
aNew York, New Haven and Hartford R.R. Co.
bNew York, Ontario and Western Railway Co.
7New York Connecting R.R. Co.
8Rutland R.R. Co.
9Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Railway Co.
10Delaware and Hudson Co.
11Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co.
12Detroit and Mackinac Railway Co.
13Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co.
14Erie System
aChicago and Erie R.R. Co.
bErieR.R.Co.
cNew Jersey and New York R.R. Co.
d New York, Susquehanna and Western R.R. Co.
15Lehigh and Hudson River Railway Co.
16Lehigh and New England R.R. Co.
17Lehigh Valley R.R. Co.
18Monongahela Railway Co.
19Montour R.R, Co.
20 New York Central Lines
aMichigan Central R.R. Co.
bNew York Central R.R. Co.
cPittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R. Co.
dCincinnati Northern R.R. Co.
eCleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co.
fEvansville, Indianapolis and Terre Haute Railway Co.
21New York, Chicago and St. Louis R.R. Co.
22Pere Marquette Railway Co.
23Pittsburgh and Shawmut R.R. Co.
24Pittsburgh and West Virginia Railway Co.
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eSt. Joseph and Grand Island Railway Co.
35Binghamand Garfield Railway Co.
36Burlington Route
aWichita Valley Railway Co.
bChicago, l3urlington and Quincy R.R. Co.
cColorado and Southern Railway Co.
dFort Worth and Denver City Railway Co.
eQuincy, Omaha and Kansas City R.R. Co.
37Chicago and Alton R.R. Co.tm
38Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co.
39Denver and Salt Lake Railway Co.
40Nevada Northern Railway Co.
41Northwestern Pacific R.R. Co.
42Rock Island System
aChicago, Rock Island and Gulf Railway Co.
bChicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co.
43San Diego and Arizona Railway Co.
Note: Half owned by Southern Pacific Co. and half by Spreckles
Securities Co.
44Wabash Railway Co.
aAnn Arbor R.R. Co.
bWabash Railway Co.
45Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railway Co.
46Baltimore and Ohio System
aBaltimore and Ohio R.R. Co.
bStaten Island Rapid Transit Co.
47Bessemer and Lake Erie R.R. Co.
48Buffalo and Susquehanna R.R. Corporation
49Chesapeake and Ohio System
aHocking Valley Railway Co.
bChesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.
50Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co.
51Chicago and illinois Midland Railway Co.
52Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Co.
53Detroit, Toledo and Ironton R.R. Co.
54Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co.
55Illinois Terminal Co.
56Pennsylvania System
aBaltimore, Chesapeake and Atlantic Railway Co.
bLong Island R.R. Co.
cPennsylvania R.R. Co.
dWest Jersey and Seashore R.R. Co.
57Reading System
aAtlantic City R.R. Co.
bCentral R.R. Co. of N.J.
cPerkiomen R.R. Co.
dPort Reading R.R. Co.286 PART TWO
eReading Co.
58Western Maryland Railway Co.
59Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway Co.
60Norfolk and Western Railway Co.
61Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. Co.
•62Virginian Railway Co.
63Atlantic Coast Line System
aAtlanta and West Point R.R. Co.
bAtlanta Birmingham and Coast R.R. Co.
cAtlantic Coast Line R.R.
dCharleston and Western Carolina Railway Co.
eClinchfield R.R. Co.
fGeorgia R.R., Lessee organization
gLouisville and Nashville R.R. Co.
hLouisville, Henderson and St. Louis Railway Co.
iNashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway
jWesternRailway of Alabama
64Columbus and Greenville Railway Co.
65Florida East Coast Railway
66Georgia and Florida R.R.
67Gulf, Mobile and Northern R.R. Co.
68Illinois Central System
aCentral of Georgia Railway Co.
bGulf and Ship Island R.R. Co.
cIllinois Central R.R. Co.
dYazoo and Mississippi Valley R.R. Co.
69Mississippi Central R.R. Co.
70 New Orleans Great Northern R.R. Co.
71Norfolk Southern R.R. Co.
72Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.
73Southern System
aAlabama Great Southern R.R. Co.
bCincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.
Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Co.
dMobile and Ohio R.R. Co.
eNew Orleans and Northeastern R.R. Co.
fNorthern Alabama Railway Co.
gSouthern Railway Co.
74Tennessee Central Railway Co.
75Chicago and Nàrth Western System
aChicago and North Western Railway Co.
bChicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co.
76Chicago Great Western R.R. Co.
77Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R.•
78Duluth, Missabe and Northern Railway Co.
79Santa Fe System
aAtchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.
bPanhandle and Santa Fe Railway Co.
cGulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co.
dKansas City, Mexico and Orient Railway Co. of Texas
eKansas City, Mexico and Orient Railway Co.
80Southern Pacific System
aSouthern Pacific Co.
bTexas and New Orleans R.R. Co.
81Toledo, Peoria and Western R.R.INVESTMENT BEFTAVIOR 287
82Utah Railway Co.
83Western Pacific R.R. Co.
84Fort Smith and Western Railway Cd.
85FriscoLines
aFort Worth and Rio Grande Railway Co.
bSt. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.
cSt. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway Co.
86Kansas City Southern System
aKansas City Southern Railway Co.
bTexarkana and Fort Smith Railway Co.
87Kansas, Oklahoma and Gulf Railway Co.
88Louisiana and Arkansas Railway Co.
89Louisiana Railway and Navigation Co.
90Louisiana Railway and Navigation Co. of Texas
91Midland Valley R.R. Co.




aBeaumont, Sour Lake and Western Railway Co.
bInternational-Great Northern R.R. Co.
cMissouri Pacific R.R. Co.
d New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Co.
eSt. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railway Co.
fSan Antonio, Uvalde and Gulf R.R. Co.
gTexas and Pacific Railway Co.
95TexasMexican Railway Co.
96St. Louis Southwestern Lines
aSt. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.
bSt. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. of Texas






aCanadian NationalLines in New England
bCentral Vermont Railway, Inc.
cGrand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (including Muskegon Railway and
Navigation Co.)
dDuluth, Winnipeg and Pacific Railway Co. (including Duluth, Rainy
Lake and Winnipeg Railway Co.)
4Canadian Pacific System
aCanadian Pacific Lines in Vermont
bInternational Railway Co. of Maine
cDuluth, South Shore and Atlantic Railway Co.
dMinneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.
eSpokane International Railway Co.T
5MaineCentral R.R. Co.288 PARTTWO
6New Haven System
aNew York, New Haven and Hartford R.R. Co.T
bNew York, Ontario and Western Railway Co.
7New York Connecting R.R. Co.
8Rutland Railroad Co.
9Cambria and Indiana R.R. Co.
10Delaware and Hudson R.R. Corporation
11Delaware Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co.
12Detroit and Mackinac Railway Co.
13Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co.
1.4Erie System
aErie R.R. Co. (including Chicago and Erie R.R. Co.)
bNew Jersey and New York R.R. Co.
cNew York, Susquehanna and Western R.R. Co. (including Wilkes-
Barre and Eastern R'.R. Co.)
15Lehigh and Hudson River Railway Co.
16Lehigh and New England R.R. Co.
17Lehigh Valley R.R. Co.
18Monongahela Railway Co.
19Montour R.R. Co.
20New York Central Lines
aNew York Central R.R. Co.
bPittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R. Co.
21New York, Chicago and St. Louis R.R. Co.
22Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
aPere Marquette Railway Co.
bChesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.
23Pittsburgh and Shawmut R.R. Co.
24The Pennroad Corporation
aPittsburgh and West Virginia Railway Co.
bDetroit, Toledo and Ironton R.R. Co.
25Pittsburgh, Shawmut and Northern R.R.
26Wabash Systema
aAnn Arbor R.R. Co.
bWabash Railway Co.
27Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railway Co.T
28Baltimore and Ohio System
aBaltimore and Ohio R.R. Co.
bStaten Island Rapid Transit Co.
cAlton R.R. Co.
29U. S. Steel Corporation
aBessemer and Lake Erie R.R. Co.
bElgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co.
cDuluth, Missabe and Northern Railway Co.
Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range as of July 1, 1937
30Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co.T
31Chicago and Illinois Midland Railway Co.
32Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Co.T
33Illinois Terminal Co.
Illinois Terminal Railroad Co. as of January 1, 1937
34Pennsylvania System
aLong Island R.R. Co.
bPennsylvania R.R. Co.
35Pennsylvania-ReadingSeashore LinesINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 289
36Reading System
aCentral R.R. Co. of New Jersey
bReading Co.
37Western Maryland Railway Co.
38Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway Co.
39Norfolk and Western Railway Co.
40Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. Co.
41Virginian Railway Co.
42Columbus and Greenville Railway Co.
43Florida East Coast Railway Co.11
44Georgia and Florida R.R. (including Statesboro Northern Railway)
45AtlanticCoast Line System
aAtlanta and West Point R.R. Co.
bAtlanta, Birmingham and Coast R.R. Co.
cAtlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.
dCharleston and Western Carolina Railway Co.
eClinchfield R.R. Co.
fGeorgia R.R., Lessee organization
gLouisville and Nashville R.R. Co.
hNashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway
iWestern Railway of Alabama
46Gulf, Mobile and Northern R.R. Co.
47Illinois Central System









cCincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.
dGeorgia Southern and Florida Railway Co.
eMobile and Ohio R.R. Co.R
fNew Orleans and Northeastern R.R. Co.
gNorthern Alabama Railway Co.
52Tennessee Central Railway Co.
53Chicago and North Western System
aChicago and North Western Railway Co.T
bChicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co.
54ChicagoGreat Western R.R. Co.T
55Chicago,Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. Co.11
56GreatNorthern Railway Co.
57GreenBay and Western R.R. Co.
58LakeSuperior and Ishpeming R.R. Co.
59Minneapolisand St. Louis R.R. Co.11
60Northern Pacific Railway Co.
61Spokane, Portland and Seattle Railway Co. and affiliated companies
62Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. and affiliated companies
63Burlington Route
aChicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co.
bColorado and Southern Railway Co.
cFort Worth and Denver City Railway Co.•290 PARTTWO
64Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co.T
65Denver and Salt Lake Railway Co.
66Rock Island SystemT
aChicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Co.
bChicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
67Southern Pacific System
aSt. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. and affiliated companiesT
bNorthwestern Pacific R.R. Co.
cSouthern Pacific Co.
dTexas and New Orleans R.R. Co.
68Toledo, Peoria a.nd Western R.R.
69Union Pacific R.R. Co.
70Utah Railway Co.
71Western Pacific R.R. Co.T
72Burlington-Rock Island R.R. Co.
73Fort Smith and Western Railway Co.B
74Frisco Lines
aFort Worth and Rio Grande Railway Co.
bSt. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.T
cSt. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway Co.
75Kansas City Southern Railway Co.
76Muskogee Co.
aKansas, Oklahoma and Gulf Railway Co.
bMidland Valley R.R. Co.
cOklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Railway Co.
77Louisiana and Arkansas Railway Co.
78Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas Railway Co..
79Missouri and Arkansas Railway Co.
80Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. and controlled companies
81Missouri-Pacific SystemT
aMissouri-Illinois R.R. Co.
bBeaumont, Sour Lake and Western Railway Co.
cInternational-Great Northern R.R. Co.
dMissouri Pacific R.R. Co.
eNew Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Co.
fSt. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railway Co.
gSan Antonio, Uvalde and Gulf R.R. Co.
hTexas and Pacific Railway Co.
82Texas Mexican Railway Co.
83Wichita Falls and Southern R.R. Co.
84Kennecott Copper Corporation
aNevada Northern Railway Co.
bCopper River and Northwestern Railway Co.
85Oahu Railway and Land Co.
CLASS I STEAM RAILWAYS, 1940
1Bangor and Aroostook R.R. Co.
2Boston and Maine R.R.
3Canadian National System
aCanadian National Lines in New England
bCentral Vermont Railway, Inc.
cGrand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (including Muskegon Railway and
Navigation Co.)INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 291
dDuluth, Winnipeg and Pacific Railway Co. (including Duluth, Rainy
Lake and Winnipeg Railway Co.)
4Canadian Pacific System
aCanadian Pacific Lines in Vermont
bInternational Railway Co. of Maine
cDuluth, South Shore and Atlantic Railway Co.T
dMinneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co."
eSpokane Jnternational Railway Co.T
5MaineCentral R.R. Co.
6New Haven SystemT
aNew York, New Haven and Hartford R.R. Co.
bNew York, Ontario and Western Railway Co.
7New York Connecting R.R. Co.
8Rutland Railroad Co.R
9Cambria and Indiana R.R. Co.
10Delaware and Hudson R.R. Corporation
11Delaware Lackawanna and Western R.R. Co.
12Detroit and Mackinac Railway Co.
13Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co.
15Lehigh and Hudson River Railway Co.
16Lehigh and New England R.R. Co.
17Lehigh Valley R.R. Co.
18Monongahela Railway Co.
19Montour R.R. Co.
20 New York Central Lines
aNew York Central R.R. Co.
bPittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R. Co.
23Pittsburgh and Shawmut R.R. Co.
24The Pennroad Corporation
aPittsburgh and West Virginia Railway Co.
bDetroit, Toledo and Jronton R.R. Co.
25Pittsburgh,Shawmut and Northern R.R. Co.R
26Wabash
aAnn Arbor R.R. Co.
bWabash Railway Co.
27Akron, Canton and .Youngstown Railway
28Baltimore and Ohio System
aBaltimore and Ohio R.R. Co.
bStaten Island Rapid Transit Co.
cAltonR.R. Co.
29U. S. Steel Corporation
aBessemer and Lake Erie R.R. Co.
bElgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co.
cDuluth,Missabe and Iron Range Railway Co.
30Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co.T
31Chicago and Illinois Midland Railway Co.
32Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway CoT






aCentral R.R. Co. of New JerseyT
bReading Co.292 PARTTWO
37Western Maryland Railway Co.
38Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway Co.
39Norfolk and Western Railway Co.
40Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. Co.
41Virginian Railway Co.
42Columbus and Greenville Railway Co.
43Florida East Coast Railway
44Georgia and Florida R.R. (including Statesboro Northern Railway)
45Atlantic Coast Line System
aAtlanta and West Point R.R. Co.
bAtlanta, Birmingham and Coast R.R. Co.
cAtlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.
dCharleston and Western Carolina Railway Co.
eClinchfleld R.R. Co.
fGeorgia R.R., Lessee Organization
gLouisville and Nashville R.R. Co.
hNashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway
iWestern Railway of Alabama
46Gulf, Mobile and Ohio
Successor to Gulf, Mobile and Northern R.R. Co. and Mobile and Ohio
R.R. Co. (July 31, 1940)
47Illinois Central System
aCentral of Georgia Railway Co.T
bGulf and Ship Island R.R. Co.
cIllinois Central R.R. Co.
dYazoo and Mississippi Valley R.R. Co.
48Mississippi Central R.R. Co.
49Norfolk Southern R.R.
50Seaboard Air Line Railway
Co.
Southern Co.
cCincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co.
dGeorgia Southern and Florida Railway Co.
eNew Orleans and Northeastern R.R. Co.
52Tennessee Central Railway Co.
53Chicagoand North Western System
aChicago and North Western Railway Co.T
bChicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co.
54Chicago Great Western R.R. Co.T
55Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. Co.T
56GreatNorthern Railway Co.
57GreenBay and Western R.R. Co.
58LakeSuperior and Ishpeming R.R. Co.
59Minneapolisand St. Louis R.R.
Co.
Railway Co.and affiliated companies
62Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. and affiliated companies
63Burlington Route
aChicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co.
bColorado and Southern Railway Co.
cFort Worth and Denver City Railway Co.
64Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. CoY'
65Denver and Salt Lake Railway Co.
66Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co.TINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 293
67Southern Pacific System
aSt. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. and affiliated companiesT
bNorthwestern Pacific R.R. Co.
cSouthern Pacific Co.
dTexas and New Orleans R.R. Co.
68Toledo, Peoria and Western R.R.
69Union Pacific R.R. Co., including its leased lines
70Utah Railway Co.
71Western Pacific R.R. Co.T
72Burlington-Rock Island R.R. Co.
74Frisco Lines
aSt. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.T
bSt. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway Co.
76Muskogee Co.
aKansas, Oklahoma and Gulf Railway Co.
bMidland Valley R.R. Co.
cOklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Railway Co.
79Missouri and Arkansas Railway Co.
80Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. and controlled companies
81Missouri-Pacific SystemT
aMissouri-Illinois R.R. Co.
bBeaumont, Sour Lake and Western Railway Co.
cInternational-Great Northern R.R. Co.
dMissouri Pacific R.R. Co.
eNew Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Co.
fSt. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railway Co.
gSan Antonio, Uvalde and Gulf R.R. Co.
hTexas and Pacific Railway Co.
82Texas Mexican Railway Co.
84Nevada Northern Railway Co.
85Chesapeake and Ohio System
aErie Railroad Company (including Chicago and Erie R.R. Co.)T
bNew York, Chicago and St. Louis R.R. Co.
cNew York, Susquehanna and Western R.R. Co.T
dPere Marquette Railway Co.
eChesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.
86Kansas City Southern System
aKansas City Southern Railway Co. and controlled companies
bLouisiana and Arkansas Railway Co. (including Louisiana, Arkansas


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DATAFOR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANIES, 1920-1941
Gross
Capital Net Construc- Gener-
Expendi- OperatingDepre-tion Cost Yield % ating
ture Incomeciation.Index New Capacity
(millions of dollars) 1911:1.00Bonds Shares(mil.kw.)
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1920 437 219 54 2.14 8.06 12.0
1921 276 240 57 1.98 7.34 8.29 12.8
1922 395 328 62 1.71 6.02 7.62 13.4
1923 723 408 74 1.90 6.14 759 14.8
1924 827 461 88 1.94 5.90 7.35 16.7
1925 766 540 102 1.93 5.55 6.13 20.0
1926 704 627 121 1.89 5.40 5.57 21.8
1927 722 716 130 1.85 5.11 4.96 23.4
1928 679 790 145 1.88. 5.01 4.09 26.0
1929 774 865 153 1.98 5.37 2.29 28.0
1930 835 911 156 1.90 5.11 3.19 30.3
1931 538 911 160 1.86 4.65 4.43 31.5
1932 257 818 161 1.74 5.66 7.36 32.0
1933 113 742 166 1.78 4.95 6.27 32.2
1934 126 729 177 1.94 4.81 6.56 31.5
1935 166 756 184 1.98 3.92 5.97 31.8
1936 251 787 197 2.03 3.56 4.31 31.8
1937 423 777 216 2.20 3.56 5.12 32.0
1938 445 757 226 2.20 3.49 6.88 33.2
1939 433 807 249 2.22 3.45 5.46 33.9
1940 466 812 260 2.26 3.09 5.67 34.4
1941 490 776 279 2.36 3.15 6.57 36.0
COLUMN
1 George Terborgh, 'Estimated Expenditures for New Durable Goods, 1919-1938',
Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1939, p. 732, for 1920-36. J. B. Epstein,
'Electric Power Output and Investment', Survey of Current Business, May 1949,
p. 23, for 1937-41.
2 Statistical Bulletin, 1948, Edison Electric Institute, p. 38. These data are for
1926-41 and are extrapolated to 1920-25 by constructing a series with the same
year to year percentage changes as Simon Kuznets' series on net income less wages
and salaries originating in electric light and power companies (National income
and its Composition, 1919-1 938), pp. 661 and 664.
3 Same as 2 for 1926-41. In the Census of Electrical industries the values of plant
and equipment of commercial central electric light and power establishments for
census dates are 1917, $2,933,016,941; 1922, $4,229,356,023; 1927, $8,880,-
291,499. Depreciation in 1917 and 1922 is estimated as the same proportion of
the valuation figures for those years as 1927 depreciation is of the 1927 valuation.
The estimates for 1918-21 are interpolated linearly between 1917 and 1922. Simi-
larly, the estimates for 1923-25 are interpolated linearly between 1922 and 1927.
4 Engineering News-Record, April 23, 1942, p. 132. These data are given for five
regions. The separate indexes are combined, into a United States index by forming
a weighted sum of the regional estimates with the weights proportional to regionalINVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 303
populationestimates from the nearest census. The index is published for January
and July of each year. An annual index is computed from a weighted sum of
beginning of year, middle of year, and end of year figures. The weights are 0.25,
0.50, and 0.25 respectively. A quotation is missing for 1922; therefore this figure
is interpolated by making it have the same ratio to the 1923 estimate as the 1922
figure of the Richey index has to its 1923 value. The Richey index is published in
the Survey of Current Business, 1932 Supplement.
S Moody's Public Utilities, 1947, p. aS.
6 Alfred Cowles and Associates, Common Stock indexes (Principia Press, 1939),
p. 373, for 1920-38; Moody's Public Utilities, 1948, p. a6, for 1939-41.
7 Statistical Bulletin, 1948, Edison Electric Institute, p. 16.





I— 1919 L(4) t>1918304 PART TWO
COMMENT
JAMES W. ANGELL, Columbia University
Most of Mr. Klein's paper is devoted to the American railroads in the
interwar period, and it is with this part of his work that I shall be chiefly
concerned.
Mr. Klein has made an important contribution to the study of business
cycles. It is important not so much because of the principal hypotheses he
sets up for examination —forin the main these are not novel —butrather
because he offers an analysis of a single major, yet relatively compact and
homogeneous, sector of the economy. It is true that the conclusions drawn
from an analysis of this type must in themselves lack generality. But they
may have greater precision and meaning than those reached for the econ-
omy as a whole, because the main categories of data handled presumably
have much greater internal consistency and homogeneity than do analo-
gous categories when taken for the economy as a whole. For the economy
as a whole, for example, the category 'gross investment' is made up of
many diverse elements, which at any one time are changing at different
speeds and often in different directions. The meaning of a change in the
national total, therefore, is inevitably somewhat ambiguous. Although
marked interfirm differences also exist even within a single industry, the
difficulties just referred to are usually much less severe within any one
industry than on the national scale. Mr. Klein's study hence makes a sub-
stantial addition to our knowledge of those specific relations in specific
economic areas, on which any general theory of economic fluctuations
must be built in some degree, and with which any such theory must be
consistent. It has the further convenience that the estimating equations
established are linear.
The American railroad industry, in the interwar period here examined,
presented certain characteristics that mark it off sharply from the majority
of the other large sectors of the economy. Most important of all, perhaps,
as Mr. Klein points out, it was approaching economic maturity. Net new
investment was still going on, but at far lower rates in the second decade
of the period than in the first. Much the highest level reached was in
1923. Gross investment likewise fell sharply. From 1921 to 1930 it aver-
aged over 750 million dollars a year, but from 1931 to 1941 under 300
million. Second, the great bulk of railroad investment is in roadbed,
structures, and rolling stock, which are relatively long lived, and which
take a good deal of time to produce. The puzzling problems of large and
rapid inventory fluctuations hence are not present; the objects of railroad
investment are, from one point of view, relatively homogeneous.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 305
Third,what were treated as maintenance expenditures were relatively
high, averaging roughly three times estimated gross investment. Fourth, a
large proportion of gross investment decisions were routine in the sense
that a large proportion consisted simply in the replacement of worn-out
capital goods, when andfunds were available. Fifth, a substantial
though shifting number of raihoads were bankrupt through most of the
period examined. Finally, government supervision and regulation was
intensive and continuous. Among other things, the ICC made it difficult
for the roads to abandon lines or even reduce service, i.e., reduce output.
All these differences from the usual situation in the larger sectors of
manufacturing industry must be kept in mind. They imposed on the eco-
nomic variables in the railroad investment situation both patterns of
behavior and apparent interrelations that were presumably not character-
istic of much of the rest of the economy.
The problem Mr. Klein sets himself is the analysis of the factors influ-
encing gross investment in the railroads. He uses two sets of data. One is a
time series for the railroad industry as a whole, over a twenty-year period;
the other what he calls a cross-section study of individual roads in each of
four years. As he says, his three principal conclusions are these. First, and
most conspicuous, investment was clearly and heavily influenced by gross
operating profits of the preceding year. The elasticity of this relation for
the industry as a whole, as estimated from the time series for the twenty
years, was 1.4; but as estimated from the slopes of the log-log regressions
in the cross-section studies, it was only 0.8 to 1.0. The study does not
provide a complete explanation of this difference. Second, gross invest-
ment was clearly but much less strongly influenced by the rate of interest.
The time series study, using yields on new railroad bonds, shows a rela-
tively low negative elasticity, of about —0.73. This is bad news, for what
it is worth, for those who wish to make interest-rate changes an important
element in analysis and policy. Finally, one or more powerful trend vari-
ables that worked to depress railroad investment were clearly in play. The
most plausible candidate is, Mr. Klein believes, the stock of capital, which
continued to grow through nearly all of the period but at a slow rate. Other
trend factors may also have been involved, however; these data do not
permit an unequivocal answer. These three principal relations he is able
to express in linear estimating equations.
These are important findings; and it is striking that the principal esti-
mating equation for the interwar period gives such good results when used
to 'forecast' the value of gross investment in 1948. But certain questions
necessarily suggest themselves.
The first and perhaps the most important concerns the relation between
gross investment and gross operating income, which Mr. Klein calls
'profits', of the preceding year. This relation, as measured in terms of306 PART TWO
deflated or 'real' volumes, was usually quite close. The chief exception is
that from 1922 through 1929 the general movement of profits as thus
defined was upward, but in 1924 and 1925 gross investment declined
sharply,' and from 1926 to 1930 was at most roughly constant. This excep-
tion, however, does not seriously affect the broad parallelism of the major
movements of gross investment and profits over time.
But what is the general economic significance of the parallelism itself?
If gross investment had shown a persistent tendency to increase relatively
more rapidly than profits, or to fall less rapidly, we would have to look
for large sources of outside funds to provide an explanation. Various other
complex problems would then have presented themselves, including an
analysis of the motives and decisions of the suppliers of the outside funds.
If gross investment, on the other hand, had persistently increased rela-
tively less rapidly and fallen more rapidly than profits, it would have looked
as though the owners of the railroads were at most trying to keep their
capital investment constant, and more probably were trying to withdraw
their capital. Neither of these things happened. In the broad, the railroads
expanded their gross investment operations when their profits permitted,
and contracted when they did not. Although there was a certain amount of
net expansion, the replacement of worn-out facilities seems to have been
the dominating component of gross investment. Given the facts that this
was a relatively mature industry, that access to additional outside funds
was relatively difficult and restrictedmost roads, and that the owners
and managers desired to stay in business, it would have been most sur-
prising if gross investment had failed to move broadly parallel to profits.
The economic significance of the relation established is therefore limited,
although it is useful to have an estimate of the coefficient.
A second and related question concerns the light the study casts on the
formulation of investment decisions and the considerations involved in
them. One has the feeling that this light is substantial; yet it is hard to
evaluate.
In the first place, as already noted, the investment data used are gross,
not net. One would expect to find that the considerations governing deci-
sions to replace worn-out or obsolescent capital goods would be in part
different from those relating to net expansions of investment, but this study
gives little explicit information on these possible differences. It is true that
the series presented for recorded and for unrecorded depreciation are
quite stable, and show relatively little year to year fluctuation. It presum-
ably does not follow, however, that the difference between them and the
'The 1923 peak in investment, which Mr. Klein does not discuss, was presumably
due to catching up on deferred replacements after the ending of government
operation.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 307
figures for gross capital expenditures represents new net investment. This
question should be clarified. The behavior of net new investment taken
separately should itself be tested and compared with the other series.
In the second place, Mr. Klein himself emphasizes that a large part of
the gross capital expenditures represented routine replacements of capital.
Replacements were made when and as funds —derivedlargely from oper-
ating income —becameavailable, and advantage was then taken of techno-
logical advances that seemed likely to be profitable. But he does not make
it appear that the desire to take such advantage of technological advances
was a major factor in most decisions to spend money on new capital goods.
Third, Mr. Klein finds that lower interest charges stimulate investment:
bond yields show a definite effect in the time series study. But this influ-
ence, even though statistically identifiable, must have been of relatively
minor quantitative importance. The interest component of the estimating
equation is numerically small; in 1923-31 the general drift of interest
rates was downward, but so was the general drift of gross investment; and
in 1935-4 1, when interest rates were far below the level of the '20's, gross
investment was also far below —thoughit is true that the general drifts
of the two series in this period were in opposite directions. It is hard to see
in this picture any clear effect of interest rate changes on gross investment
decisions.
Moreover, Mr. Klein measures interest charges only by bond yields;
and whereas in the time series study he uses new issues alone, in the cross-
section study he uses outstanding issues. Since the real objective is pre-
sumably to measure the cost of obtaining additional capital funds, it is
not easy to see why the effects of including stock issues, and likewise other
forms of longer-term borrowing, were not also tested. The effect of capital
costs on investment decisions might then stand out more sharply.
Fourth, no systematic data are provided to show the extent to which
gross investment was financed with funds drawn from outside sources.
Without such information, however, it is difficult to make any complete
appraisal of the nature and characteristics of the investment decisions that
were in play. It is presumably one thing to decide to reinvest from operat-
ing income, but something rather different to decide to bring in new money
from outside. The absence of data on the sources of funds, and the absence
of any analysis of them, seem to me a major gap in the study as presented.
It would also be helpful, incidentally, to have some sort of partial balance
sheet showing all that was done with operating income. For example, no
data on cash positions are given, and therefore it is not possible to appraise
the effect of changes in cash holdings on investment decisions.
Fifth, Mr. Klein is disposed to explain the generally downward trend of
gross investment primarily in terms of the stock of capital, which was itself308 PART TWO
slowly increasing. But surely his argument here is debatable. Many other
industries, in which the stock of capital was also large, showed rising rather
than falling trends in their gross investment. Moreover, as the stock of
capital grows, the replacement component of gross investment, other things
equal, should likewise increase, not fall. Rather, the most plausible super-
ficial 'explanation' of the declining trend is simply that net new investment
in the railroads was declining, that the industry was approaching maturity!
Why this should have been so is in no sense explained by the data pre-
sented here.
Sixth, Mr. Klein cites the great traffic increases during World War II,
in the face of a nearly constant stock of capital, as evidence that "the rela-
tions imposed by the acceleration principle are not generally valid". This
inference seems to me unwarranted. The principle surely implies full utili-
zation of existing facilities before the 'acceleration' process begins. But
the wartime traffic increases were obtained largely by using existing
facilities more efficiently, especially by decreasing freight-car turn-around
time. That is, the facilities had in effect been seriously under-utilized before
the war.
Finally, what is perhaps a minor point, I am not entirely comfortable
with discussions of investment decisions that are couched in terms of the
relation between deflated variables, when one of these variables is lagged.
At times, the railroad construction index used as a deflator fluctuated from
one year to the next by as much as 9 to 11 per cent. This means that the
data on operating income for the preceding year, which were actually avail-
able to the decision makers, differed by these amounts from the data used
in the present study, and could well have led to conclusions different in
degree and even in direction from those here implied.2
On balance, I come out with two conclusions which are rather unsatisfac-
tory from the viewpoint of general business cycle analysis, though 1
hasten to add that they are only preliminary.
First, Mr. Klein himself indicates that in the period here studied, gross
investment in the railroads was in the main an essentially passive function
of previous operating income and of the desire of the railroad managers
to stay in business. But this means that its size was determined largely by
the levels of income, the volume of business activity, and the movements
of costs and prices, in the rest of the economy. It seems quite possible that
gross railroad investment would show as close a relation with any one of
several aggregative national economy variables, or perhaps a combination
of them, as with gross railroad profits. If this proved to be so, one might
I am indebted to Miëhael Gort of Columbia University for helpful discussions of
some of the preceding questions.INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 309
then interpret changes in gross railroad profits as merely a vehicle or
channel —andperhaps only one of several —throughwhich national
economy aggregates affected the railroads. In other words, Mr. Klein has
shown that his hypothetical explanation of gross investment in terms of
previous gross profits is plausible both on a priori and on statistical
grounds, but he has not tested comprehensively, nor attempted to test,
what we may call the exclusiveness of this hypothesis. He has tested the
explanatory value of several variables other than profits that lie within the
immediate universe of the railroad industry itself, but not of major vari-
ables that in the main lie outside the railroad universe as such, yet that
likewise might plausibly be thought to have explanatory value with respect
to railroad investment. Such further tests of exclusiveness should not be
difficult on an exploratory scale, and I believe should be made.8
Second, on Mr. Klein's own showing, in this period the railroad industry
does not seem to provide a very rich field for the study of investment deci-
sions. This is true precisely because gross investment was apparently so
largely determined by the levels of activity in the rest of the economy. It
was not determined primarily by independent initial decisions of the rail-
road managements to expand, for example, in the expectation of large
future traffic increases (as had been true in earlier decades); or to expand
in order to profit by technological advances, of which they hoped to obtain
the sole or at least the earliest command; or to expand in order to take
advantage of favorable interest rates.
If these inferences are justified, however, the fluctuations in gross rail-
road investment were still an important factor in our general economic
scene; but from the viewpoint of business cycle analysis, the chief proxi-
mate 'explanation' of these fluctuations proposed, which runs in terms of
gross railroad profits, seems to be of somewhat limited interest, except for
the usefulness of getting a preliminary determination of the form and
coefficient of this relation. Perhaps an analysis of net investment taken
alone, a more detailed examination, of the major sources and uses of funds,
and a separation of the solvent roads from those which went bankrupt,
would yield 'more sharply focused results.4
'In a sense this is perhaps a criticism of Mr. Klein for not succeeding in what he did
not even attempt to do. Obviously the national aggregates, such as national income,
are not part of the internal 'structure' of the railroad-industry universe. The preced-
ing comments relate more properly, perhaps, to a subsequent stage of the analysis,
when the railroad industry will be related to the national economy as a whole. Yet
these comments also bear directly, I think, on the general meaning of the results
obtained even at this early stage of the analysis.
Thus an inspection of the charts in the cross-section study suggests that the slope of
the investment-profits relation for the bankrupt roads was not the same as for the
solvent roads, and in at least one of the four years, 1940, was probably not linear.310 PARTTWO
WASSILY LEONTIEF, Harvard University
I
Being obviously unable to do full justice to Klein's interesting and highly
provocative paper in thirty minutes, I shall concentrate attention on two
points that appear to me to be of fundamental importance. The first is the
general question of the effectiveness of the well known techniques of indi-
rect statistical inference (based in most cases on time series) as applied
to the explanation of as complex a phenomenon as the investment behavior
in general and investment in a single branch of the national economy in
particular; the second is the much more special problem of the importance
or unimportance of the changes in the level of output of an industry as a
factor to be considered in connection with explaining the investment beha-
vior of that industry, in short, the role of the 'acceleration principle'.
Before arriving at his final equations, one explaining the annual rates
of the aggregate gross investment in the American railroads of the twenty
years 1920-4 1 in terms of four independent variables (gross operating
profits, interest rates on new capital, the total stock of capital, and the price
of capital goods), the other explaining the difference between investments
of individual railroads in terms of the same types of independent variables
but on the basis of several cross-cut studies, and the last explaining annual
aggregative investment changes in the electric utilities between 1920 and
1941, again in terms of similar variables, Klein presents a very interesting
discussion of factors affecting investment in general and a not less illumi-
nating discussion of various institutional and technological circumstances
affecting the railroads' investment in particular. I submit that, in turning
to the indirect statistical estimation of parameters of his final explanatory
equations, Klein neglects almost completely, and he could not do other-
wise, all the various important considerations enumerated in the intro-
ductory sections of his paper. Technical changes, and the replacement
requirements, for example, to mention two of the most significant of these
explanatory factors, are left entirely out of the final analysis. To be explic-
itly used in actual explanation, these factors would have to be not only
mentioned but systematically described in concrete quantitative terms,
admittedly a task of no mean proportions but which, I suppose, will have
to be accomplished before one proceeds toward a real interpretation of the
investment behavior of the American railroads or of any other industry.
I surmise that, once this indispensable factual information has been col-
lected and put to work, it will also carry the main weight of the actual
explanation, while the indirect statistical inference used by the author as
the principal operational basis of his analysis will be relegated to a sec-
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In this connection it is consoling to observe that, relieved from the
unbearable burden so frequently assigned to them in econometric analysis,
these methods of statistical estimation will also be much less exposed to
the very annoying difficulties connected with the so-called 'identification
problem', that is the problem of deciding, after one has computed all
the various regression coefficients, what real relationship they actually
represent.
In discussing, for example, the coefficient that reflects the statistical
relationship between investment on the one hand and the relative prices
of capital and labor on the other, Klein expects it to be negative on the
ground that a reduction in the relative price of capital should increase the
demand for that factor and pan passu reduce the demand for labor. He
does not take into account the fact so well presented in one of his own
earlier publications that this coefficient might represent not the negative
slope of the demand curve for capital but rather the positive slope of the
corresponding supply curve. Here we are obviously skirting the margin
of the all too often neglected distinction between studies designed to dis-
cover previously unknown empirical relationships and studies that are only
intended to test the efficiency of the analytical tools employed by com-
paring the relationship obtained with the help of these tools with the pre-
viously known true relationships.
.11
Turningto the second more substantive point of these comments, I would
like to question Klein's radical decision to disregard entirely the change in
the output of an industry as a possibly important factor in the analysis of
the rate of investment in that industry. Through the concept of a produc-
tion function the relation between the level of output and the quantities of
various factors (including stocks of capital) plays a central role in the
modern theory of the firm. Through the acceleration principle in combina-
tion with the notion of technical change, it has been used as an important
element in the formulation of dynamic models. Why doesn't Klein like
the capital-output relationship?
His paper, excepting a few casual critical observations on the accelera-
tion principle, does not answer that question. In experimenting with vari-
ous alternative explanatory equations, he tries out and rejects a great
number of possibly relevant variables but in no instance does he consider
the change in the rate of output of an industry in its relation to the change
in its rate of investment —noteven in the case of the electric utilities
which nearly quadrupled the scale of their operation in twenty years.
To see whether this studied neglect might have a formal statistical rea-
son, I have derived as a comparable alternative to Klein's 'explanation' of312 PART TWO
the twenty-year railroad investment series a different equation in which
profits —thecentral explanatory variable of his statistical relationships —
areentirely omitted and output figures (car-miles and kilowatt hours
respectively) are used in conjunction with his two other independent vari-
ables, the bond yield and the total stock of capital.
I =1,205,474+ 0.027P + 2005 ii + 0.061K....1 + u
(0.0038) (22300) (0.025)
R=0.91
I, K, i, and u represent investment, total capital, interest, and 'random
errors' as in Klein's original equation, while P is the annual output mea-
sured in car-miles. The figures in parentheses are the standard deviations
of the corresponding regression coefficients.
Klein's 'explanation' gives a coefficient of multiple correlation of 0.95
while the new equation, using the level of output as a principal explanatory
variable, gives a corresponding coefficient of 0.91.
Even in the case of railroads where the applicability of the acceleration
principle would be less obvious, the rather crude introduction of output
as an explanatory variable and the omission of the profit factor gives good
statistical results. The close relation between the fluctuation in gross
annual investment and the ups and downs of output is in this case, I think,
due to the fact that postponable maintenance and replacement expendi-
tures constitute a large part of gross railroad investment. Such expenditures
are likely to be reduced in times of low traffic and increased in years of
rising traffic, for obvious technical reasons.1
Although abstaining from making any explicit use of 'output' as one
of the explanatory factors in his analysis, Klein in his cross-cut studies
'deflates' the capital, income, and other variables that describe the position
of each individual railroad by dividing each by the output of that railroad
as represented by the number of annual 'train hours' run by it. Does this
operation represent anything except an implicit acknowledgment of the
importance of the 'level of output' as a strategic factor to be used in explain-
irig the 'level of investment'?
In the course of the same cross-section study, Klein rightly observes
that the bankrupt railroads systematically invest a much larger amount of
capital than that which would correspond, according to his explanatory
equation, to their obviously low level of profits. He considers this behavior
to be the sign of increased demand for cheapened capital because of
defaulted interest payments. The necessity to maintain a given rate of
'During the general discussion of Klein's paper Franco Modigliani stated that a
replacement of the profit variable in Klein's electric utilities equation by an appro-
priate output variable increased the correlation coefficient. A similar result was
obtained by Hollis Chenery in his as yet unpublished thesis (Harvard, 1949).INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 313
output (level of traffic) irrespective of the current rate of profit might, I
think, give a better explanation of this exceptional (from the viewpoint of
Klein's equations) behavior.
This leads me to the final query. Are total profits a good explanatory
variable in the analysis of the investment behavior of an industry? In so far
as they are usually correlated with the level of output and the latter variable,
for one reason or another, is excluded from consideration, it is obviously
better to have it represented indirectly than not at all. In so far as undis-
tributed profits constitute an important component of the total capital
supply, they might have independent significance but in this connection the
'identification problem', i.e., the distinction between supply and demand,
is likely to become particularly bothersome.
In affecting the relative attractiveness of any particular kind of invest-
ment, profits certainly might play a significant role in directing the flow
of capital, but considered from this point of view, profits in their turn
depend to a large extent on the volume of sales, i.e., the level of output.
This consideration is particularly important if statistical equations are to
be used for predictive purposes. Demand can, I think, at present be pre-
dicted much more easily than the profit per unit of output.
In this connection it should be observed that profits are used in all
Klein's equations with a one-year lag while the output variable in my
alternative computations is entered without any lag. Examination of the
corresponding time series indicates, however, that the introduction of such
a lag into the investment-output relation might somewhat improve the
statistical results. In so far as at least one variable, the interest rate, in
Klein's equations is used without a lag, these also could not be utilized
directly for predictive purposes.
Within the wider framework of more general dynamic analysis (of
which the investment equations of individual industries naturally consti-
tute only a small part) the outputs of individual commodities and services
will, I think, be 'explained' more easily than the corresponding profit
figures which typically represent a much more volatile element of the
economic system. Thus from this wider point of vj,ew even for purely
pragmatic, predictive purposes preference would have to be given to the
output as against the profit variable.
REPLY BY MR. KLEIN
An author of a research paper is indeed fortunate to have the benefit of
criticism from two. such scholars as Professors Angell and Leontief who
have obviously read the manuscript assigned to them with care. In their314 . PARTTWO
discussion, however, points are raised on which I feel compelled to render
further comment.
Leontief and I are agreed that empirical, quantitative research should
build wherever possible on a priori information of an institutional, legal,
technological, theoretical, and other sort. We are, however, at opposite
poles on the problem of mixing this information with methods of statis-
tical inference. I interpret Leontief as arguing that information obtained
from engineers, legal sources, and the like should be dominant in the
empirical determination of investment behavior equations. I offer the
countersuggestion that this sort of information is invaluable as far as it
goes, but that it leaves us hopelessly distant from any useful objective.
Investment processes are permeated with economics as distinct from engi-
neering, for example, and the of the situation can in many
cases be inferred from empirical observations. Even in the case of the
estimation of production functions, where technical engineering infor-
mation carries its greatest weight, there are very few processes that could
be estimated from such information alone, without the aid of statistical
inference. "
Thereare various ways in which I used a priori information in deriving
my estimates of investment equations for United States railroads, and I
would like to stress these facts for the reader's benefit since Leontief claims
that I have 'neglected almost completely' to incorporate outside considera-
tions in my empirical equations. In the first place, the fact that gross invest-
ment outlays of railroads contain a large sum representing routine replace-
ment led me to use gross rather than net operating income as a strategic
variable of analysis. In debating in my own mind whether to use 'profits'
rather than output (contrary to Leontief's inference that I decided to over-
look output), I was impressed by the fact that the ICC asked railroads to
estimate their postwar investment outlays on the basis of an assumed oper-
ating income realized in 1941. I would guess that the ICC has an excellent
insight into railroad decision making processes and consequently attaches
some significance to the form of its questionnaire. I am also encouraged in
this respect by the that answers to this question were obtained through-
out the industry.
The decision to separate out the bankrupt carriers from some of the
cross-section analyses was based on legal and institutional considerations.
The form of the resulting equation is substantially affected by this step.
I frankly do not believe that it would be possible to go even a major
part of the distance toward my final goal without using statistical inference.
The shape of functions and the size of parameters cannot be determined
from information supplied by engineers and lawyers; at best these sources
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Certainly, it should be pOssible to go much further in the direction of
Leontief's approach. Carefully designed interview surveys of executives
who make investment decisions have great potential value, but this is an
extremely difficult project that is yet to be carried out, and for the moment
research on investment behavior will have to rely more heavily on statis-
tical inference than Leontief would like to admit.
The fact that the use of statistical inference from nonexperimental obser-
vations brings in the problem of identification is no reason to turn away
from these methods. Inherent in the nature of social scientific analysis is
the identification problem, one important reason being that truly controlled
experiments cannot be used except in some rare cases. Leontief in his
approach must unfortunately face the identification problem also. If he
obtains frdm engineers some superficial capital-output ratios, is he justified
in interpreting these ratios as parameters in an investment function, a Ia
naive acceleration principle? I would argue that capital-output ratios can-
not be generally identified with any structural equations in economic
systems, but that in some cases they come closer to approximations of pro-
duction functions than anything else. One point that I would make emphati-
cally is that such ratios do not lead us directly to an equation of investment
behavior. A related point is whether I claim that I can in my paper identify
the estimated parameters with structural properties of railroad investment
behavior. Leontief's allusions to the traditional identification problems in
supply-demand analysis or in the determination of the aggregate invest-
ment function play upon false analogies. The conventional situation is the
following: supply and.demand variables are indistinguishable as statistical
observations under nonexperimental conditions since inventories are not
adequately handled. If they are equal and both depend upon the same price
variables there is often no method of making a statistical distinction
between the supply equation and the demand equation. A parallel situation
prevails when and its equal, investment, are each written as func-
tions of the same income (or output) variable. Again inventories are
usually not given adequate treatment. But do I face the same situation
with regard to railroad investment? The industries supplying capital goods
to railroads or the institutions supplying financial resources to railroads
do not behave according to exactly the same set of variables that determine
railroad investment (demand) behavior. I have tried to select my motivat-
ing variables in a very limited way so that they would not overlap with
the variables on the supply side. If Leontief wants to push his point deeper,
he must turn to a specific analysis of the supply side of the market rather
than rely on casual references to other problems that do not even have the
same formal mathematical structure as the one at hand. To me it is quite
clear that I have the identification I need for a study of railroad investment316 PART TWO
behavior. At the most aggregative level of analysis, I believe that the iden-
tification problem is overcome in the estimation of savings and investment
functions if some of the variables are sharpened. Income in the personal
savings function should be personal disposable income, and if profits are
used in the investment function, full identification is likely to be achieved,
depending, of course, on the structure of other equations in a complete
system. I mention this point because I consider it as a further argument for
using profits rather than output in the investment equation.
It is true that the acceleration principle has been utilized in some
dynamic models developed as theoretical curiosities. I can find no place
for a pure technological acceleration principle as an explanation of an
economic phenomenon such as investment behavior on either theoretical
or empirical grounds. At the theoretical level, it is only in very special
circumstances that any accepted theory of the firm implies the acceleration
principle for investment demand. Leontief thinks that the acceleration
principle comes into being once the theory of the firm is developed from a
production function including the stock of capital as a variable. I raise
an objection at this stage and argue that the stock of capital has no place
in the production function. The appropriate variable in this case is the
flow of capital services. Idle capital does not produce output, and the
intensity of utilization of employed capital has an effect on output. To
draw an analogy, I would say that the labor force or the number of persons
employed is not an appropriate variable for the production function. Man-
hours are a much more satisfactory measure. The passage from the stock
of capital to the flow of capital services (train-hours perhaps in the railroad
industry, at least, for equipment capital) is much the same as the passage
from the labor force to man-hours. This discussion has the additional
relevance to Leontief's comments that it shows he has misinterpreted a
measure of the flow of capital services (train-hours or train-miles) as a
measure of output (ton-miles or passenger-miles) at twp places in his
paper.
Among his general arguments supporting the acceleration principle for
railroad investment, Leontief remarks that postponable maintenance con-
stitutes a part of gross railroad investment. I fail to understand the mean-
ing of such a statement. I wrote plainly in my paper that I was investigating
outlays on capital account (investment), not outlays on current account
(maintenance). Railroad accounting procedures distinguish clearly be-
tween the two types of expenditure.
Angell observes that the acceleration principle implies full employment
of existing capital and uses this to argue against my contention that the
acceleration principle is not generally valid. His admission of the implica-
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valid and is precisely one of the things IL had in mind when rejecting the
principle.
Leontief's empirical argument of a high correlation between car-miles
(not a measure of output) and investment as evidence supporting the
acceleration principle is indicative of the most dangerous type of promis-
cuity in econometrics. High correlation is not an objective or a criterion
for correctness. The objective is to estimate structural behavior patterns,
and although the statistical probability properties of the estimates are
important coilsiderations, high correlation is not one of them. The residual
variation (random disturbances) is assumed to behave like a random
variable, but it is not necessarily expected to be small, especially for a
discussion of investment behavior. Unless there is some mistake in the
calculation of some of Leontief's coefficients, I would argue that the
strange values he gets for the effects of i and K on investment are enough
to lead me to believe that his formulation is incorrect.
Leontief's rationalization of the relatively high investment by bankrupt
railroads in terms of his own theory of investment behavior neglects much
information that is known in the industry about the effect of court reorgani-
zation. If the only objective were to meet traffic, the bankrupt companies
could have done so with their old equipment and other capital facilities.
Reorganization enabled bankrupt roads to issue attractive first mortgage
bonds and thus get capital at a reasonable charge in order to modernize
with a view towards realizing expected profits. I fail to see how the accëler-
ation principle can be worked into such behavior.
As a final remark in reply to Leontief, I must again labor the point that
the goal of the present investigation is to estimate patterns of investment
behavior. The pragmatic use of a single equation for the pure prediction
of investment is as useless a criterion of correctness as high correlation.
There is some point in extrapolating estimated equations beyond the
sample observation to see how they are related to independent observa-
tions, but one must await a final process of fitting the equations of invest-
ment behavior into a more complete system of relationships before the
usefulness in prediction is judged. At present, Leontief's so-called prag-
matic arguments are not helpful in choosing between output or profit as
a variable in the investment equation.
Angeli raises a question about the choice of net as opposed to gross
investment. In other empirical studies, I have the net concept, and
under the pressure of criticism switched to gross investment in the present
study. The reasons for preferring the gross concept are that gross capital
outlays are more intimately related to aggregate activity and that basic
investment decisions are more likely to be formulated in gross than in net
terms. Railroad investment decisions are made in terms of so many freight318 PART TWO
cars, locomotives, square feet of floor space, signals, etc. It seems unreal-
istic to subtract depreciation from gross investment, regardless of the
correctness of the depreciation estimates, then consider the transformed
variable as an objective of entrepreneurial decisions.
Simple two-variable relationships that Angell cites between investment
and interest or investment and capital may be quite misleading. Most
economic processes are multivariate, and many things must be considered
simultaneously. A positive relation between investment and interest rates
alone would not be the least disturbing if the relation turned out to be
negative after the effects of profits, capital stock, and other variables were
taken into account.
Two remarks about the effect of capital accumulaiion on investment
are in order. Angell must bear in mind that the concept of maturity is not
entirely independent of the size of the capital stock; thus he has not pro-
duced an alternative explanation of trend factors in railroad investment
by referring to maturity instead of the stock of capital. Secondly, the
replacement effect does not necessarily impose a positive component on
the coefficient of K in the investment equations since the replacement effect
is taken care of by using gross rather than net operating income as a
measure of profits.
Share issues did not play much of a role in railroad finance during the
period studied. A sources and uses analysis is hardly necessary to establish
this point. While the conditions of the share market should not be expected
to have much influence on railroad investment, they may be of much more
importance in the electric utility industry. On the basis of criticism by
Angel! and others, I did make some later investigations about the impor-
tance of share yields for electric utility investment and, as stated in the
revised version of my paper, find it to be of some plausible significance.
The effect of the cash was not neglected, as Angell states. Some
calculations involving working capital are mentioned in the original ver-
sion of the paper, and the findings are largely negative for the railroad
industry. More direct measures of cash holdings were usedthe cross-
section studies, with similar results.